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In contrast to past literature on competitive bribery, the thesis demonstrates that com-
petitive bribery for rents generated from market distortions is inefficient. However, self
enriching policy makers have incentives for implementing these distortions in order to
maximize the appropriation of rents. Their success in raising distortions is higher when
the electoral process is easily manipulated. Thus distortions are higher and last longer in
the absence of electoral accountability. Such distortions worsen the deprivation of human
capabilities and functionings, as evidenced by worsening health outcomes among children
in Zimbabwe after the policy changes since 2000.
Market distortions are sub-optimal and attract bribery. Given arguments in the literature
that competitive bribery is efficient, this thesis investigates whether this “efficiency out-
come” extends to bribery for rents generated from distortions. This analysis questions the
generalization of the “efficiency outcome” from models of competitive bribery. The the-
sis applies auction theory to demonstrate that a symmetric model of competitive bribery
can produce an inefficient outcome. In particular, it shows that efficiency in competitive
bribery models is sensitive to the source of rents. If the valuation of rents is misaligned to
society’s preferences, then competitive bribery produces an inefficient outcome. The gen-
eralization that competitive bribery is efficient is therefore misleading. This is illustrated
using rents generated from market distortions hence the outcome confirms the inefficiency
of bribery for rents generated from market distortions.
Bribes for rents generated by market distortions accrue to office bearers. Therefore, self
enriching policy makers find rent generating distortions attractive despite their negative
impact on efficiency and social outcomes. These policy makers seek to extract maximum
rents from distortions subject to constraints imposed by considerations for political sur-
vival. The political considerations are determined by the quality of electoral institutions.
When electoral institutions are weak, incumbents can use electoral fraud to circumvent
political pressure generated by the negative effects of high distortions. They maximize on











democratic regimes will therefore choose higher levels of distortions. They are less likely
to adjust high distortions too. The thesis demonstrates this argument using a model of
electoral accountability to compare distortions chosen by an incumbent with and without
the possibility of electoral manipulation. The model shows that an incumbent chooses
higher distortions when electoral manipulation is feasible.
This theory is confirmed on exchange rate distortions in Sub-Saharan Africa. Dictatorships
overvalue by between 22.4 and 26.6 percentage points more than complete democracies.
These estimates are obtained from dynamic panel GMM estimation using data for non
CFA Sub-Saharan countries. The quality of democracy is measured by the polity 2 score
from the Polity IV data and exchange rate overvaluation by the black market to official
exchange rate ratio. Further confirmation of the hypothesis comes from conditional logit
estimation results. They show that undemocratic regimes are more likely to excessively
overvalue the exchange rate than democratic regimes. This explains the persistence of
excessive distortions in countries with weak institutions. Such distortions can not be
wholly attributed to lobbying by special interest groups or to the political use of economic
inefficiency as generally argued in the literature.
Zimbabwe offers a practical example of distortions which are implemented or sustained
for maximizing the appropriation of rents by the incumbent. The government stepped up
its intervention in markets since 2000. The resulting distortions shifted command over
resources and placed them in the hands of the elite while their intensity and persistence
had devastating effects on the economy. Elections over this period have been accompanied
by electoral intimidation and manipulation. Thus the incumbent government relied on
electoral manipulation to continue the appropriation of rents from market distortions.
Zimbabwe provides a good case study of the consequences of market distortions that are
sustained to benefit the incumbent in the presence of weak democratic institutions.
The thesis uses the 1999 and 2005/06 DHS data to make a comparative analysis of changes
in social outcomes after the policy shift in Zimbabwe. This analysis sheds light on the
social costs of market distortions that are sustained to benefit the incumbent. The average
number of items consumed by under 5 year old children declined by 34%, mean height for
age by 19% and mean weight for age by 16%. The biggest declines were on outcomes for
children living in poor and middle class households. Children in richer households were the
least affected. The significant negative coefficient of food consumption in the height and
weight for age regressions show that food consumptions worsened child health outcomes.
The decline in food consumption contributed to 37% and 57% decline in means of height












Wealth inequality in 2005/06 was 16% relatively higher than inequality in 1999. Wealth is
measured by an asset index derived from principle component analysis and its inequality
by the McKenzie 2005 index. Inequality in food consumption increased as evidenced by
a change in the Kakwani concentration index for food consumption by 48% of the 1999
value. A decomposition of changes in health inequality shows that increased inequality
in food consumption contributed to increased nutrition inequality by a magnitude of 11%
and 6% of stunting and underweight concentration indices in 1999.
These results indicate that market distortions worsened social outcomes in Zimbabwe.
Yet the distortions persisted for almost a decade due to weak electoral accountability
in that period. This shows that a weak intuitional environment which erodes electoral
accountability promotes policies that are costly to society. Distortions that arise from
such policies have an impact that extends beyond efficiency in allocation. They affect
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1.1 Overview of the thesis
Despite continued calls for reform, market distortions remain widespread across the world.
For example, only 39.4% of firms in the World Business Environment Survey for 2000
(WBES 2000) reported absolute non interference by government in their pricing decisions.
In the agriculture sector, significant distortions in the form of tariffs, subsidies, commodity
taxes and price controls remain in place. Indeed, the Welfare Reduction Index (WRI)
of market distortions in tradable agricultural commodities in African countries averaged
30% in the 2000 - 2004 period and remained above 25% in 2007 (Anderson & Croser
2009)1. Further evidence of government interventions in pricing across the world comes
from controls on the price of tortillas in Mexico in 2008 and the reverting to blanket price
controls by the Zimbabwean government in 2007. Thus reliance on market distortions as
a policy tool remains high.
Due to this prominence in economic policy, market distortions still warrant attention in
both academic and policy discourse. As part of the discourse, this thesis focuses on three
distinct issues related to both the political economy and economic consequences of market
distortions. The thesis places great emphasis on the rent generating effects of market
distortions, particularly how rents influence the level of distortions chosen in a particular
1The WRI measures the effects of distortions on a country’s welfare. The index is calculated as a uniform
tariff that results in an aggregate loss in welfare equivalent to that caused by the actual distortions. The
reported WRI for agriculture is based on a sample of 75 countries accounting for 92% of the world’s













economy and their implications for efficiency and the distribution of social outcomes.
The specific emphasis on market distortions’ rent generating effects emanates from the
recognition that market distortions cause corruption (Bardhan 2006, Aidt 2003, Rose-
Ackerman 1999). This ushers us into the “grease vs sand” controversy in the literature on
corruption. On one hand, is the argument that corruption is “sand” which reduces growth,
investment and productivity and increases costs (Mauro 1995, Wei 2000). On the other
hand, it is argued that corruption is “grease” which facilitates trade, promotes allocative
efficiency, lowers costs and clears the market (Leff 1964, Beck & Maher 1986, Egger &
Winner 2005). This debate continues to attract attention in the literature (see Aidt 2009,
Aidt & Dutta 2008).
The “greasers” argue that bribery enhances efficiency when regulation is bad (pioneered
by Leff 1964) and that when bribery is competitive, efficiency in allocation is maintained.
The first argument has already been countered by Kaufmann & Wei (1999) but the sec-
ond argument is largely unchallenged. Indeed some proponents of the “corruption as sand”
hypothesis concede that competitive bribery is efficient (Rose-Ackerman 2002). In this ar-
gument, auction theory is applied to models of competitive bribery focusing on symmetric
equilibria, to demonstrate that bribery is efficient– even under incomplete information.
This prompts the following question: Does this “efficiency outcome” hold for competitive
bribery for rents generated from market distortions? This brings to question the general-
ization of the efficiency outcome in competitive bribery models.
This question is motivated from observing that market distortions are suboptimal (from
the first welfare theorem). It is natural to question whether bribery for rents generated by
a suboptimal policy lead to an efficient outcome. Previous models of competitive bribery
are based on bribery for fixed price contracts. The rents from this contract are higher
for the least cost firm. It pays the highest bribe and gets the contract hence efficiency is
maintained. Is this efficient outcome not simply generated from a coincidence/alignment of
the source of rents to society’s preferences as determined by the model specification? What
happens when an inefficient producer values the rents more than an efficient producer?
These questions form the thesis’ first research issue which shall be addressed in chapter
2. The chapter uses a model in which firms bribe competitively to capture rents from
input subsidies. High cost firms obtain higher rents from this input subsidy. They bribe
more and get the input subsidies ahead of lower cost firms. Competitive bribery promotes
inefficiency in this case. This is in contrast to outcomes that have been generated in other
competitive bribery models (see Lien 1986, Kim 2000).












1.1. Overview of the thesis
preferences. Societies prefer not to subsidize inefficient producers. However the sub-
sidy benefits inefficient producers more than it benefits efficient producers. Incentives for
bribery are therefore higher for inefficient producers who then pay higher bribes, hence
the contrast. Indeed, the valuation of rents generated from market distortions is generally
mismatched with preferred outcomes in society. The rents increase corruption too. Never-
theless, distortive policies continue to be implemented despite the existence of alternative
instruments that are more efficient and produce better outcomes. Distortions seem to
be preferred (Bates 1987) despite increasing inefficiency, bribery and the possibility of a
regressive benefit incidence due to their rent generating effects. Why is that so?
To address this question, the thesis revisits the discussion on why market distortions are
a preferred policy instrument and why they persist. It argues that the same ills of market
distortions, i.e. bribery and regressive benefit incidence, makes them very attractive for
implementation by self enriching policy makers. Literature on the political economy of
market distortions generally argues that political considerations play a critical role in
determining market distortions. Either distortions are set in response to lobbying by
special interest groups (Bates 1987, Grossman & Helpman 1994), or they represent a
tactical redistribution of excludable benefits to key constituencies by politicians seeking to
secure political power (Cox & McCubbins 1986, Dixit & Londregan 1996). These theories
assume a complete democracy and their emphasis on the objective of securing political
power lead to predictions that are inconsistent with any distortions that make a majority
of voters worse off. Yet such distortions are observed in practice. The thesis departs from
the assumption of complete democracy to explain the existence of excessive distortions.
The thesis argues that private financial motives play a more dominant role in weak democ-
racies where policy makers seek to maximize the appropriation of rents generated from
market distortions. Political considerations are important only for defining the constraints
to the appropriation of these rents. When electoral institutions are weak, incumbents use
electoral fraud to circumvent political pressure generated by negative effects of high dis-
tortions. They maximize on financial rents by raising the levels of distortions. Thus
more democratic societies will have lower distortions than autocratic societies similar in
characteristics other than the political regime. This argument is presented in chapter 3.
The argument is illustrated using a model of electoral accountability to compare distor-
tions chosen by an incumbent with and without the possibility of electoral manipulation.
The outcome of the model indicates higher distortions in the former. Empirical sup-
port of this result is then presented for the case of exchange rate over-valuation in Sub












regimes over-value the exchange rate by a higher magnitude than fully democratic ones.
In addition, conditional logit estimation results show that totally autocratic regimes are
more likely to have excessive exchange rate over-valuation than democratic regimes. With
undemocratic tools to subvert political pressure, they can continue to appropriate rents
from an overvalued exchange rate for a relatively longer period. This was the case with
distortions in Zimbabwe since 2000.
Since 2000, the Zimbabwe government made major policy changes towards greater gov-
ernment intervention in markets. Subsequent polices introduced economy wide distor-
tions like exchange overvaluation, price controls, dual pricing and selective subsidies.
These generated high rents. There is anecdotal evidence that only a privileged few
(mainly those in positions of influence), benefited from these distortions (Reserve Bank of
Zimbabwe 2006, ANDNetwork Journalist 2006). The continued existence of these distor-
tions has been attributed to the benefits they brought to the elite (Chikukwa 2004).
Distortions in Zimbabwe persisted despite their apparent negative impact on the major-
ity of citizens and their perverse effects on the economy as a whole. The weakness of
democratic institutions and perceived manipulation of elections in Zimbabwe since 2000
are evident. The incumbent government continued to extract high rents because it used
electoral manipulation to mitigate political pressure caused by welfare losses from market
distortions. Thus distortions in Zimbabwe are a good example of distortions sustained to
financially benefit the incumbent in a weak institutional environment. This makes Zim-
babwe a good case study for analyzing the welfare impact of rent generating distortions
sustained to benefit the incumbent in the absence of electoral accountability. This case
study is done in chapter 4.
Chapter 4 shall investigate the impact of market distortions on health outcomes among
children in Zimbabwe. Focusing on this social outcome departs from the predominant
focus on the macro effects of market distortions. The particular focus on health outcomes
is motivated by a number of reasons. First, health is a direct measure of well-being (Sahn
& Younger 2005, Sahn & Stifel 2003). Secondly, health has wide reach and relevance such
that Sen (2004)[pp78] noted “the freedom to be well nourished and live disease free lives”
among capabilities any theory of justice or social assessment cannot overlook. Thirdly,
health achievements largely influence people’s ability to exercise most other freedoms and
capabilities. Last but not least, health inequality is materially relevant if the source is
poor economic policy (Sen 2002), as with the case of market distortions which are the
focus of analysis in this thesis.












1.2. Objectives of the thesis
distortions on health outcomes in Zimbabwe?” The thesis hypothesizes that policy changes
generated rents that benefited only a few by design. This shifted command over resources
and placed them in the hands of a few people in positions of influence. The majority were
left with minimal resources. This reduced access to food and worsened health outcomes on
average. The poorest were the most affected since a majority of beneficiaries from rents
are the elite. Thus policy changes increased wealth and consumption inequality. This
ultimately increased health inequality.
The chapter presents empirical evidence from a comparative study using the 1999 and
2005/06 DHS data for Zimbabwe to support the above hypothesis. The study finds that
on average, food consumption declined across all wealth quartiles. However, the decline
was greater for children living in households in the poorest and middle wealth quartiles.
It was lowest for children in the richest quartile. Both the mean of height for age and
mean of weight for age declined significantly. Regression results highlight a significant
contribution of the decline in food consumption to the decline in both height and weight
for age.
Estimates of the McKenzie’s (2005) index of wealth inequality shows that wealth inequality
was relatively higher 5 years after the policy changes. Based on the Kakwani concentra-
tion index, inequality in food consumption increased too. A decomposition of changes in
health inequality reveals a substantial contribution of the increase in food consumption in-
equality on increases in health inequalities. These findings indicate that increased market
distortions in Zimbabwe since 2000 have far reaching adverse effects on intrinsically im-
portant aspects of human well-being. These findings highlight the negative effects of high
market distortions designed to maximize the extraction of rents in a weak institutional
environment.
1.2 Objectives of the thesis
In pursuit of the research issues highlighted above, the thesis aims to achieve the following
objectives
1. Construct a counter-example to show that competitive bribery is not generally effi-
cient but depends on the source of rents
2. Provide an alternative theory on incentives for market distortions that highlights the
influence of quality of electoral institutions and is consistent with the existence of













3. Empirically analyze the social impact of market distortions with specific reference
to their impact on health outcomes
1.3 Organization of the thesis
This chapter has established the area of focus, introduced the research issues and outlined
the objectives of the thesis. The research issues shall be dealt with in three essays each
constituting a chapter. The first essay is presented in chapter 2. It develops a theoretical
model to demonstrate that the “efficiency outcome” of competitive bribery is sensitive to
the source of rents. Specifically, it shows that “efficiency” emanates from the coincidence
of society’s preferences and firm’s valuation of rents which is not the case with most
distortions.
Chapter 3 argues that distortions are sometimes implemented to maximize benefits from
bribes and other forms of rent appropriation subject to institutional constraints. This
argument presents an alternative theory for explaining the existence of excessive distortions
that cannot be adequately explained by existing theories. The theory is tested on exchange
rate overvaluation in non-CFA Sub-Saharan countries.
Chapter 4 explores the effects of market distortions on social outcomes. This is done
through an empirical examination of the impact of market distortions on health outcomes
in Zimbabwe. Lastly, chapter 5 draws conclusions from the outcomes and findings from
the three analytical essays and discuss their implications. It also highlights future areas













Bribery and efficiency: A counter-example
from rents generated by market distor-
tions
2.1 Introduction
Although the adverse effects of corruption seem apparent, there has been debate on the
economic effects of corruption. On one hand, some argue that corruption is “grease” which
facilitates trade, promotes allocative efficiency, lowers costs and clears the market. On
the other hand, others argue that corruption is “sand” which increases costs and reduces
growth, investment and productivity (Aidt 2009). Models of competitive bribery with
a focus on symmetric equilibria, have been used to demonstrate that bribery is efficient
(Lien 1986). This has been supported by similar conclusions from competitive bribery in
procurement. Indeed, some proponents of the “corruption as sand” hypothesis concede
that competitive bribery is efficient (Rose-Ackerman 2002).
This chapter questions the generalization of this result. It specifically questions whether
the “efficiency outcome” holds for competitive bribery for rents generated from market dis-
tortions. The chapter appeals to auction theory to illustrate its argument. In a symmetric
equilibrium, a bidder with the highest valuation of the auctioned item makes the highest
bid and wins the item. Thus, whenever there is coincidence between bribers’ valuation












2. Bribery and efficiency: A counter-example from rents generated by market distortions
contracts and procurement contracts are such examples. In these cases, low cost firms
obtain higher rents from the contract than high cost firms. They offer higher bribes and
win the contracts. This allocation is efficient because society is better off when the least
cost firm wins the contracts. Can this outcome be generalized?
The chapter argues that this “efficiency outcome” can not be generalized. Competitive
bribery is inefficient whenever the valuation of rents is misaligned to society’s preferences,
even if we restrict ourselves to symmetric equilibria. Input subsidies are a good example.
An inefficient producer gets higher rents from an input subsidy than an efficient producer.
The inefficient firm will pay a higher bribe and get the subsidy ahead of the efficient
producer in the absence of liquidity constraints. However, society does not prefer to
subsidize an inefficient producer. The bribery outcome is not efficient. This contradicts
the general conclusions from competitive bribery models and proves that the “efficiency
outcome” from these models is sensitive to the source of rents. The “efficiency outcome”
is a particular rather than a general case. This explains the weak empirical evidence in
support of the “grease” hypothesis despite numerous theories advanced in its favor (see
Aidt 2009).
The valuation of rents from the input subsidy is misaligned to society’s preferences in this
example. This is the source of inefficiency in the outcome. Rents generated from market
distortions are misaligned to society’s preferences in general. For example, less competitive
firms bribe politicians to obtain legislation that guarantees monopoly rents, higher tariffs
in their sectors while advocating for price ceilings in others. Rents in these cases are more
valuable for less competitive producers and reduce the welfare of society. Thus competitive
bribery for rents generated from market distortions is generally inefficient.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 provides an overview of the debate on
economic consequences of corruption and looks at efficiency in competitive bribery models
in the literature. Section 2.3 builds the model of competitive bribery based on rents from
an input subsidy and presents its solution. Section 2.4 discusses the general implications
of results and section 2.5 concludes the chapter.
2.2 Economic consequences of corruption: A review
The debate on the economic consequences of corruption has been termed the “grease or
oil vs sand” controversy. This debate is on going (Aidt 2009, Aidt & Dutta 2008). The












2.2. Economic consequences of corruption: A review
effects. They argue that corruption reduces investment, diverts government expenditure
from productive spending, increases transaction costs, distorts allocation of talent and
increases inequality. Through these effects, corruption reduces economic development
(Rose-Ackerman 1999).
The negative impact of corruption on growth was highlighted by Mauro (1995). Mauro
argued that corruption reduces investment and hence economic growth. He estimates cross
country growth regressions to provide empirical support for the argument. The estimates
show that an improvement in the corruption index by one standard deviation increases
investment by 2.9% of GDP and improves annual growth rate of GDP by 0.8 percentage
points. This finding is reinforced by evidence that corruption reduces the quality of public
sector investment (Mauro 1998, Tanzi & Davoodi 1997) and shifts government expenditure
away from productive components to those where bribes can be easily generated (Wei
2000). “White elephant” projects in most African countries are a case in point.
Corruption also affects economic development by reducing productivity in the private
sector. This is illustrated by Blackburn, Bose & Haque (2006). Bureaucratic corrup-
tion reduces revenue that accumulates to the government. This inhibits public sector
investments. Private sector productivity which depends on public infrastructure is con-
sequently reduced. The quality of private investment is negatively affected by corrup-
tion too. Entrepreneurs are discouraged from adopting irreversible but more productive
technologies if such technologies attract higher bribe payments. Instead, they opt for
the informal sector or inefficient “fly-by-night” technologies which reduce costs of ad-
justment to future bribe demands by corrupt officials (Svensson 2005). Others (Rose-
Ackerman 1999, Rose-Ackerman 2002) highlighted that bureaucratic corruption increases
transaction costs through bribe payments and the opportunity cost of otherwise produc-
tive time managers spend with bureaucrats. The consequence is a slowdown in economic
activity and a rise in unemployment.
Bribery and rent seeking stifle entrepreneurship and distort incentives. This alters the
allocation of talent (Murphy, Shleifer & Vishny 1991, Murphy, Shleifer & Vishny 1993,
Acemoglu 1995). Income earned from bribery may be higher than income earned through
honest and productive entrepreneurship activities. Therefore, rent seeking activities at-
tract talent away from productive activities. This consequently stifles growth. Acemoglu
& Verdier (1998) in particular, use an example in which the best talent abandons en-
trepreneurship and compete to be bureaucrats in order to capture rents from bribery.
This reduces innovation, productivity and prospects of economic opulence.












2. Bribery and efficiency: A counter-example from rents generated by market distortions
argue that bribery of tax collectors by the rich compromises the ability of governments
to generate resources for transfers to disadvantaged groups of the society. Therefore,
the gap between the rich and poor widens. Foellmi & Oechslin (2007) show that under
credit rationing, bribery in the banking sector prevents poor but innovative individuals
from engaging in entrepreneurship. This restriction to entry generates monopoly rents for
the existing (already rich) entrepreneurs. The poor are condemned to become low wage
laborers while existing entrepreneurs enjoy monopoly rents. A similar argument is applied
to licensing and business registration. Talented individuals who cannot afford to pay
large bribes are restricted from entry into entrepreneurship (Ahlin 2001). This increases
inequalities in an economy hence corruption is bad.
However, some dissenting voices argue that corruption is good. There are two lines of
argument that are offered. The first, due to Leff (1964), is that corruption is grease which
oils the wheels of commerce. The second, due to Lui (1985) and Beck & Maher (1986),
is that bribery generates an efficient outcome whenever it is competitive. Arguments in
support of corruption as grease are centered around these two ideas.
Leff (1964) argued that bribery allows greater participation by entrepreneurs and provides
a way around red-tape. This way, corruption actually improves efficiency and serves as
an insurance against bad policies. Egger & Winner (2005) concurs and provides empirical
support of this view. Contrary to many other studies (e.g. Wei 2000, Cuervo-Cazurra
2006), Egger & Winner finds that FDI increases with corruption. Additional theoretical
arguments in favor of the hypothesis came from Huntington (1968). He argued that
bribery enhances participation of marginalized communities otherwise excluded by the
existing rules. Hence corruption is good. Aidt (2003) also alludes to the argument that
corruption is good because it increases allocative efficiency.
Braguinsky’s (1996) paper offers a more sophisticated argument. The paper attempts to
demonstrate that corruption may actually increase adoption of new technology thus in-
creasing economic growth. This argument runs as follows. The desire to capture monopoly
rents encourages innovation. Although innovation increases growth when it is adopted
quickly, it is beneficial to an entrepreneur only if others adopt it with a delay. Bribery
of researchers, which happens with a lag, quickens the adoption of new technology while
providing the innovator a small window period to profit from the innovation. Such bribery
is therefore good for the economy. This reasoning implicitly assumes that corruption only
takes place after observing the benefits of the innovation. This rules out forward look-
ing corruption behavior hence the argument is questionable. In any case, why rely on












2.2. Economic consequences of corruption: A review
The bottom line in the “corruption is grease” argument is that bribery is good whenever
regulation is bad because bribery is a way around the bad rules. This argument has
been countered by Kaufmann & Wei (1999) using a sequential game in which the level
of red tape is endogenous. The first mover is the bureaucrat, who chooses the level of
red tape that maximizes revenue from bribery. The firm is the second mover, which after
observing the red tape, offers a bribe to maximize its profits. The optimal strategy for the
bureaucrat is to set red tape at a level that induces a firm to pay the maximum bribe it
can afford. Consequently, firms that can pay more face greater obstacles and any benefits
from “cutting corners” are lost.
Based on data from three worldwide surveys, Kaufmann & Wei provide empirical support
for their argument. They find a positive correlation between the amount of bribes and
time spend negotiating rules with bureaucrats. More evidence has been found from firm
level data. In particular, Svensson (2003) find that bureaucrats demand higher bribes from
more profitable firms in Uganda. Using the WBES (2000) data, Clarke & Xu (2004) found
evidence that more profitable firms pay higher bribes to parastatals. Both papers argue
that extortions are higher for more profitable firms instead of the postulated argument that
more profitable firms are willing to pay more. Taking this into consideration, along with
weak evidence in support of the “greasers”, there is little merit in the “grease” hypothesis
(Aidt 2009). This leaves the second argument which I now turn to.
The second argument is that when bribery is competitive, it generates an efficient outcome
and serves to clear the market (Lui 1985, Beck & Maher 1986, Lien 1986). This led to
the generalization that competitive bribery is efficient (see Rose-Ackerman 2002). This
chapter disputes this generalization and hopes to contribute towards settling the debate.
In so doing, the chapter highlights the inefficiency of market distortions. However before
considering the argument against this generalization a brief review of the “competitive
bribery is efficient” hypothesis is provided below.
2.2.1 Competitive bribery and efficiency
The notion of an efficient outcome from competitive bribery was popularized by the work
of Beck & Maher (1986) and Lien (1986). The later, (Lien 1986) uses the former’s result
showing isomorphism between competitive bidding and bribery to show that competitive
bribery is efficient under incomplete information. Lien proves the existence of a unique












2. Bribery and efficiency: A counter-example from rents generated by market distortions
Lien uses a model in which n firms, each knowing only its production cost ci, compete for
a government contract with a predetermined price P . The n firms privately negotiate with
a government official for this contract. They fully know that a firm offering the highest
bribe is awarded the contract. Each firm has incomplete information on rivals’ costs. It
assumes that each rivals’ costs is drawn independently from a common distribution F (z),
generating a common distribution of gross profit z = P − c with support [z, z]. A firm has
a bribe function Bi(z) which is assumed to be a strictly monotonically increasing function
of its gross profits. Each firm seeks to maximize its expected profits given by (2.1)
E[π(Bi)] = (zi −Bi) ∗ Pr(Bj ≤ Bi,∀j = 1, ...., n) (2.1)
Assuming that bribes are reimbursed, the expected profits are given by the gross profit
net the bribe paid, multiplied by the probability of getting the contract. This probability
is simply the joint probability that all the other n− 1 firms pay a lower bribe. Thus the
firm maximizes (2.2)
E[π(Bi)] = (zi −Bi)
n∏
j 6=i
F [B−1j (Bi)] (2.2)
Solving for the bribe functions for each firm from the first order condition of (2.2) gives a
Nash equilibrium which is unique if firms adopt the same distribution function F (z). If
all firms have common beliefs about the cumulative density function over possible gross
profits, this equilibrium is symmetric. The optimal bribe function in this equilibrium is
given by (2.3)






In this equilibrium, the most profitable firm offers the highest bribe1 and is awarded the
contract. Thus bribery is efficient. This outcome is a common result in auction theory. In
symmetric equilibria, a bidder who places the highest value on the auctioned item always
wins. The efficiency result holds in Lien’s (1986) model because the source of rents is a
fixed price contract and differences in rents (valuation) emanate from differences in costs.







1)f(t)Fn−2(t)dt] = E[Y2|Y2 < zi] where Y2 is the second order statistic. It thus follows that Bi(z) is












2.2. Economic consequences of corruption: A review
Lower cost firms have higher rents. Therefore, the least cost firm pays the highest bribe
and gets the contract. The outcome is thus efficient since optimal allocation entails the
least cost firm getting the contract.
This result has been upheld in procurement models where firms compete in two dimen-
sions, the bid price (sometimes price and quality combination) and the bribe offer. One
example is the result from Kim’s (2000) paper on competitive bribery in procurement. The
paper models the behavior of firms competing for a contract to be awarded by a corrupt
bureaucrat. The bureaucrat has some discretion to manipulate bids in favor of the highest
briber. However, his ability to manipulate bid prices is limited by an exogenous probabil-
ity of detection. This probability is increasing in the price he sets. Each firms knows only
its own cost and competes on the bid price and side payments. A firm offering a bid price
-bribe combination generating the highest utility to the bureaucrat gets the contract. It
is shown that the least cost firm wins the contract in both the case of kickbacks (bribes
are reimbursed to losers) and that of entry costs (no bribe reimbursement). Therefore,
the allocation outcome under competitive bribery is similar to that of competitive bid-
ding in the absence of corruption. Thus competitive bribery is efficient (also see Büchner
et al. 2006).
Burget & Che (2004) offer a qualified conclusion. They show that competitive bribery in
procurement is efficient only when the agent doesn’t have substantial power to manipulate
bids. Otherwise, there exists multiple equilibria in which the inefficient firm wins with
a positive probability. Nevertheless when the procurement agent is corrupt, the buyer
designs a scoring mechanism which ensures the more efficient firm wins the contract under
competitive bribery. In the final analysis, an efficient allocation ensues.
The efficiency outcome in the above models should not be generalized because they are
limited only to symmetric equilibria. Auction theory predicts that the efficiency outcome
does not hold in asymmetric equilibria and multi-object auctions with multi-unit demands
(Klemperer 2000, Krishna 2002). The first is analogous to bribe discrimination in a bidding
process in which a bureaucrat or buyer has a soft spot for particular firms. The second
relates to multiple tenders administered by the same bureaucrat/procurement officer. Both
cases are widespread in reality. Lien (1987) and Lien (1990) respectively show that when
firms have asymmetric information and when the bureaucrat discriminates among firms,
an efficient allocation is elusive.
This chapter offers another critique by showing that even in the realm of symmetric com-
petitive bribery, inefficient outcomes are possible and perhaps more prevalent. I argue












2. Bribery and efficiency: A counter-example from rents generated by market distortions
of rents across firms coincide with society/buyer’s interests. However, subsidies on inputs
pose a different problem. With input subsidies, differences in valuation are misaligned
with society’s preferences. Inefficient firms value the rents more than efficient firms but
society prefers the efficient firm to get the subsidy. We should expect an inefficient outcome
if auction theory is similarly applied. Consequently, the “efficiency outcome” is sensitive
to the model set-up, particularly the source of rents vis-à-vis society’s preferences. The
model considered below seeks to demonstrate this point.
2.3 The model
Consider the following environment with n risk neutral firms facing different costs of
operation2 ci = αix, where ci denotes costs for firm i of cost type αi. The cost type is
randomly distributed over support [α, α]. All firms’ cost types are independently drawn
from an identical distribution with probability distribution F (α) and density f(α). Firms
have a unit demand of an input X with a market price xm, but the government has decided
to supply it at a subsidized price xs < xm. The government has insufficient resources to
give the subsidy to all firms, therefore, the subsidized input is rationed. It can only be
given to k < n firms3. Thus a firm’s profit function is Πi = R − αix, where x ∈ {xs, xm}
and R is revenue4.
Firms apply and get assessed by a bureaucrat to get this input. Under fair allocation,
a firm has probability k/n of getting this input. Giving a bribe increases the likelihood
for getting the subsidized input if the bribe is accepted. The bureaucrat faces a cost of
accepting a bribe ς reflecting the degree of honesty (or incentives he faces). He accepts a
bribe whenever it exceeds this cost and rejects it when the bribe offered is below the cost.
For simplicity, assume that ς = 0 5. Firms are then ranked by the size of their bribes with
the k-highest bribers getting the input. Thus bribery is competitive. Firms compete for
2A more general cost function is described in appendix 2.A
3the reader is referred to chapter 3 for the incentives and political economy of such a subsidy
4An alternative model yielding the same result is one in which government compensates or subsidies
a proportion θ of eligible firms’ particular cost component or is considering such legislation for certain
sectors yet to be identified. Define costs ci, the subsidy to firm/sector i is si = θci. Clearly then, high
cost firms/sectors will gain more from the compensation/ subsidy than low cost firms/sectors. Therefore,
the result of our analysis applies to such a framework. However, this particular form is preferable because
it exhibits a clear and simple demonstration of how merely changing the profit function (hence rents)
specification changes the outcome.
5The assumption of zero costs is made for simplicity. Relaxing this assumption changes the game into
a discriminatory auction with a reserve price instead of a discriminatory auction without a reserve price.













the input only. Except for bribes, the bureaucrat has no strategic interests in any of the
firms.
The sequence of events is as follows
1. Nature determines the cost type (αi) of the firm.
2. Each firm observes only its cost type. It applies for the subsidized input with a bribe
offer bi ≥ 0 assuming that other firms are independently drawn from a common,
continuously differentiable distribution F (α).
3. The bureaucrat receives firm i’s application and decides whether to accept or reject
the bribe. The bureaucrat ranks firms according to the size of their bribes and the
top k ranked firms get the subsidized input. In the event of a tie on the kth highest
bribe, the input is allocated using a lottery.
4. If granted, firm i pays the subsidized price otherwise it pays the market price
Except for the source of rents, this model adopts all assumptions by Lien (1986). Following
the result in Lien, a common cumulative distribution is assumed to guarantee a symmetric
equilibrium. A multiple unit case is considered here since subsidies generally benefit more
than one firm. From auction theory, multiple unit auctions result in inefficient allocations
when bidders have multi-unit demand. Therefore, single-unit demand is assumed because
it generates a solution similar in outcome, to that of the single unit case (Krishna 2002).
The source of rents is the defining difference between this model and Lien’s (1986) model.
Consequently, differences in efficiency outcomes are attributable to the misalignment be-
tween society’s preferences and rent seekers’ due to subsidies, in contrast to the align-
ment observed in models of procurement or contract awarding. Note that rents stem
from rationing of the subsidy in this model. This matches stylized facts about develop-
ing countries– they subsidize but they rarely command enough resources to provide for
everyone.
2.3.1 Solving the model
Given the profit function Πi = p − αix, firm i’s profits are Πsi = p − αixs if it gets a
subsidized input and Πmi = p − αixm if it fails to get the subsidized input. Without
corruption, the subsidy is allocated using a lottery hence the probability of a firm getting
the input is exogenous. Thus firm i’s expected profits in the absence of corruption are
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m − xs) (2.4)
From this expression, a firm’s expected profits equals its profits when it pays the market





xs)). High cost types obtain higher rents for any given probability of winning the subsidy
(i.e. α2(xm−xs) > α1(xm−xs) whenever α2 > α1). Expected rents are increasing in both
the probability of getting the subsidized input and the size of the subsidy. Consequently,
firms have an incentive to offer bribes to increase the probability of getting these rents.
Introducing bribery
Now assume that firms can offer bribes according to some bribe function βi(α) to increase
the probability of getting the subsidized input. The bribe function is assumed to be a
strictly monotonically increasing function of the cost type since rents are increasing in the
cost type. In essence, this restricts the type of equilibrium solution to symmetric equilibria
only. A profit maximizing firm’s problem is to offer a bribe (b) that maximizes its expected
profits. At this point, I make use of Beck & Maher’s (1986) result showing isomorphism
between competitive bidding and competitive bribery. The same agent who wins under
competitive bidding wins under competitive bribery.
Accordingly, the above game is set as a multi-unit auction where bidders (bribers) have
single unit demand. In this auction, the bureaucrat is the seller of k units of the subsidized
input and the k-highest bidders (bribers) get the subsidized input. Rents that accrue
from the subsidy are the equivalent of the value, v, a bidder (a firm) attaches to the
auctioned object (in this case the subsidy). Thus vi = αi(xm − xs), with the common
support [v, v] = [α(xm − xs), α(xm − xs)]. The rents value v is increasing in the cost type
α. Its distribution, F (v), is a scaled distribution of α . This game is equivalent to a
discriminatory auction since each briber pays the bribe he offers and the k-highest bribers
get the subsidized input.
Lets restrict attention to symmetric equilibrium and appeal to the assumption that the
bribe function, βi(v), is a strictly monotonically increasing function of the cost type (or
equivalently the value of the subsidy to the briber). Then the probability of firm i getting
the subsidized input is the probability of exceeding the order statistic Y n−1l , where l = n−k.
The superscript n− 1 emphasizes that the sample size for the order statistic is n− 1 (i.e.














I illustrate this for firm 1 of cost type α1, hence rents value v1, offering a bribe b. Sup-
pose that all firms i 6= 1 follow the symmetric equilibrium β∗(v) which is increasing and
differentiable in v. Firm 1 gets the subsidized input only if b > βl(v), where βl(v) is the
lth ranked bribe when bribes of the other n− 1 firms are ranked in ascending order. Since
β(v) is increasing, firm 1 wins whenever β(vl) = β(Y n−1l ) < b, where vl corresponds to
the rent value to the lth ranked cost type (also ranked in ascending order such that the
highest cost type firm has the highest rents valuation for the subsidy). Thus firm 1 wins
whenever Y n−1l < β
−1(b). Define G(yr), the probability distribution of the order statistic
Y n−1r with the density function g(yr). After substituting for v = β−1(b), the probability
of success of a bribe b is given by (2.5) 6.




(l − 1)!(k − 1)!
f(z)[1− F (z)]k−1[F (z)]l−1dz (2.5)
We now turn our attention to characterizing the optimal bribe function in a symmetric
equilibrium.
Lemma 1 The case of kickbacks - If bribes are reimbursed to losers, there is a sym-




zf(z)[1− F (z)]k−1[F (z)]l−1dz∫ v
v
f(z)[1− F (z)]k−1[F (z)]l−1dz
= E[Y n−1l |Y
n−1
l < v] (2.6)
Proof. This is a direct application of Krishna’s (2002) solution for a multi-unit first-price
auction with a single-unit demand. The expected surplus for firm i is
πi = G(β
−1(b))[v − b] (2.7)
The first order condition for maximizing the expected payoff7 with respect to b is
(v − b) g(β
−1(b))
β′(β−1(b))
−G(β−1(b)) = 0 (2.8)
6The density of a rth order statistic yr from a random sample of size N with a pdf f(v) is g(yr) =
N !
(r−1)!(N−r)!f(v)[F (v)]
r−1[1 − F (v)]N−r. For the briber to win, he has to beat the lth ranked bribe from
the remaining n− 1 firms hence the sample size is n− 1 and r = l thus N − r = k − 1 since n = k + l
7The firm faces a participation constraint that πi ≥ 0. However the participation constraint is not
binding for all other cost type except the lowest cost type. This is a standard outcome in symmetric
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Multiplying by β′(β−1(b)) and taking into account that at a symmetric equilibrium b =
β(v) and that β(v) = 0 , the first order condition can be expressed as a differential equation
in (2.9) whose solution is given in equation (2.10).
d
dv











From equation (2.10), the bribe function is the expected rents (value) of the lth ranked
bribe from the n − 1 remaining firms conditional on that value being less than firm 1’s
rents(valuation). Substituting for G(v) in 2.10 using (2.5) yields the expression given by
(2.6).
To prove that β∗(v) is indeed the symmetric equilibrium, it suffices to show that there is
no gain from deviation for a player j 6= i with value vj, when all the other players play
strategy β∗(v) in equation (3). I refer to the proof by Krishna (2002)[pp17-18] since the
arguments are exactly the same. A similar proof is provided for lemma 2 below.
Intuitively, a firm can win for certain if it offers a bribe higher than the lth ranked rents
value. This is only profitable if that bribe is less than its own rents value, otherwise the
firm is better off without bribing. Note that a firm does not offer a bribe greater than or
equal to its valuation. Assuming it does, then its payoff is zero irrespective of whether
it loses or wins. If it offers a bribe less than its valuation, it gets a positive payoff if it
wins and zero if it loses. Therefore its expected payoff is greater than zero. Consequently
offering a bribe equal to one’s valuation is a weakly dominated strategy while offering a
bribe greater is strictly dominated. Since the lth ranked firm never bids its own valuation,
a weakly dominant strategy for any firm is to offer the expected value of the lth ranked
rents value conditional on it being less than the firm’s own rents valuation.
Lemma 2 The case of entry costs - If bribes are not reimbursed to losers, the game is
equivalent to an all pay auction (i.e. a discriminatory auction in which all bidders


















Proof. This too is a simple extension of a single unit all pay auction to a multiple unit
case with single-unit demand. The expected profits for firm i are
πi = vG(β
−1(b))− b (2.12)
The first-order condition for maximizing expected surplus with respect to b is
vg(β−1(b)) = β′(β−1(b)) (2.13)
Also noting that in symmetric equilibrium b = β(v) , the first order condition can be
expressed as a differential equation in (2.14)
β′(v) = vg(v) (2.14)
This differential equation implies that the slope of the bribery function depends on the
density function g(v). This slope is positive since by definition, both v and g(v) are
positive. If rents are bounded above by v and g(v) → 0 as v → v, the bribe function
will become flatter as v → v and reaches a maximum at v. In this case, the firm with the
highest valuation (the highest cost type) will pay the highest bribe.
Solving for (2.14) using the fact that β(v) = 0 and integrating by parts, we get the





To prove that β̂(v) is the symmetric equilibrium, it suffices to show that there is no gain
from deviation for a player with value v, when all the other players play the strategy given
by (2.11). I now show that any bribe offer b 6= β̂(v) will lower the firm’s expected profits.
Define w = β̂−1(b) i.e. the rent value for a firm that would offer bribe b in equilibrium,
then firm j ’s expected profits π(b, v) are given by (2.16) after substituting for b = β̂(w).
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π(β̂(v), v)− π(β̂(w), v) = (w − v)G(w) +
∫ v
w
G(z)dz ≥ 0 (2.17)
When w > v, (w−v)G(w) > 0 and
∫ v
w
G(z)dz < 0 but less than (w−v)G(w) in magnitude




is greater in magnitude, thus the above expression is positive. This is illustrated in figure
2.1. for a firm with valuation v1. Note that (w − v)G(w) is the area of a rectangle with
width (w − v) and length G(w) while
∫ v
w
G(z)dz is the area under the G(z) curve with
a lower and upper bound of v and w respectively. Offering a bribe higher than β̂(v1) is




G(z)dz = −C therefore (w2 − v1)G(w2) +
∫ v1
w2
G(z)dz = D ≥ 0. Offering a bribe
greater than β̂(v1) reduces the expected surplus by D in this case. Offering a lower bribe
is illustrated as an offer of β̂(w1) where w1 < v1. In this case (w1 − v1)G(w1) = −A and∫ v1
w1
G(z)dz = A + B therefore (w1 − v1)G(w1) +
∫ v1
w1
G(z)dz = B ≥ 0. Thus offering a

























bribe lower than β̂(v1) will reduce the expected surplus by B. This shows that deviating
from β̂(v) by either offering a higher or lower bribe has no beneficial gain. Thus β̂(v) is a
symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Also note that a firm will not offer a bribe b > β̂(v) since it will increase the chances of
getting the subsidy but will certainly pay more for it. Reducing its bribe offer will increase
its expected profits. Thus a firm will offer a bribe b ≤ β̂(v). However, we have shown
that offering a lower bribe does not increase expected profits either. As such (2.15) is the
symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Corollary In the above bribery game, firms reveal their cost types
Proof. Follows from the above analysis that firms don’t have an incentive to deviate.
Since firms’ values are uniquely determined by their cost types, the above proof essentially
implies that a firm has no incentive to mimic another cost type
In the symmetric equilibrium, high cost firms offer higher bribes and receive the subsidized
input. To see this clearly, the first order condition of (2.12) is expressed as
αi(x
m − xs) d
db
G(β−1(b)) = 1 (2.18)
Increasing the size of the bribe has two offsetting effects. It increases the probability
of getting the subsidy hence increases expected rents but it increases the amount a firm
pays for these rents as well. The first order condition in (2.18) implies that an optimal
bribe offer equates the marginal benefit of the bribe (i.e. the increase in expected benefit
from bribery which is the LHS of (2.18)), to the marginal cost of bribery (RHS). For the
same bribe offer, high cost types have higher marginal benefits. Since marginal costs are
the same for all cost types, this implies that high cost types will offer higher bribes in a
symmetric equilibrium.
Proposition 1 In a bribery game in which rents are higher for inefficient firms, they pay
higher bribes and are awarded the subsidized input ahead of low cost firms. The least cost
firm always buys the input at the market price 8.
Proof. Follows from the bribery strategies from lemmas 1 and 2 . Consider the first
8This analysis takes revenue as given while implying coexistence of high and low cost firms. This is
plausible when firms are price takers otherwise there is room for the low cost firm to undercut. Under
perfect competition this coexistence holds only in the short run since all firms earn normal profits in the
long run hence high cost firms will be pushed out. A compeling case can however be made for commodity
producers in a small country case. In this case, coexistence of high and low cost producers is permissable
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order condition of (2.12) as presented in (2.18) for firms 1 and 2 of cost types α1 and α2
respectively. The implication of (2.18) is that at the optimal bribe offer bi,
α1(x
m − xs) d
db1
G(β−1(b1)) = α2(x
m − xs) d
db2
G(β−1(b2)) (18a)




G(β−1(b2)). Since bi = arg max
b
{πi =
vG(β−1(b))−b}, the second order condition for a local maximum requires that d2
db2i
G(β−1(b1)) <
0. Hence α1 > α2 implies that b1 > b2, otherwise bi does not maximize the surplus from
bribery. However, the proof of lemma 2 which also applies for lemma 1, has shown that
bi = β̂(vi) maximizes the surplus from bribery. Therefore high cost type firms offer higher
bribes than low cost types in equilibrium. Note from the bribery strategies from lemmas
1 and 2 that the lowest cost type firm does not bribe. It always buys the input at the
market price.
The proposition implies that competitive bribery for an input subsidy leads to an inef-
ficient outcome. This is an apparent contradiction to the general conclusion that com-
petitive bribery does not lead to loss of allocative efficiency. The contradiction derives
from differences in the source of rents assigned to the auctioned commodity in different
models. In models applied to procurement/contracting, the rents are derived from the
value of contracts such that low cost firms have higher profits. As a result, low cost firms
pay a higher bribe and get the contract. On the other hand, rents from input subsidies
are higher for inefficient producers. They pay higher bribes and get the subsidized input
while more efficient producers get the input at the market price, hence the contradiction.
An illustration of the optimal bribe functions is made in two examples below. The first
assumes uniform cost types. This implies a society in which the cost types of firms are
evenly distributed across [α, α]. The second example mimics a society with a higher
concentration of inefficient firms. It uses cost types drawn from a beta(4,2) distribution
with a common support [α, α].
2.3.2 An illustration with uniformly distributed cost types
When the cost type has the standard uniform distribution, the rents value will be uniformly
distributed on [0, v] where v = (xm − xs). For expositional clarity, consider the case of 3














Figure 2.2. Equilibrium bribe function with uniform cost types























Substituting (2.19) into (2.11), the equilibrium bribe function when bribes are not reim-






Note that the highest bribe is 1
3
(xm−xs). This is offered by the highest cost type. Bribery
9The illustration focuses on this case since a priori, it imposes entry costs to firms. Kim (2000) notes
that entry costs are a more prevalent form of corruption in LDCs. Also, the bribe taker prefers not to
reimburse bribes in a one shot game.
10When the cost type is uniformly distributed in the range [α, α], the rents are uniformly distributed on
[v, v]. Thus G(v) =
∫ v
v




G(z)dz = −(v−v)(v+v−2v)(v−v)2 and the optimal bribe function is
3vv2−2v3
3v2
which gives a highest bribe offer
of 13 (x












2. Bribery and efficiency: A counter-example from rents generated by market distortions
offers positive expected rents since firms never offer bribes equal to their rents. The highest
cost firm offers the highest bribe equal to a third of the subsidy thus generating rents which
are two thirds of the subsidy in this example. While allocation using bribery awards the
subsidy to the firm that get higher rents, it does not allocate to firms that use the subsidy
to the greatest benefit to society. Instead, the allocation promotes inefficiency.
Comparison with a different distribution
The effect of changing the composition of firms by increasing the proportion of inefficient
firms in the game is analyzed below. A comparison to the outcome obtained when the
cost types are uniformly distributed is also made. Lets assume that the cost type now
has p.d.f f(α) where f is a beta(4, 2) distribution. The cost type is now skewed to the




for the uniform distribution with α ∈ [0, 1]. The bribe
function when the cost type follows a beta(4,2) distribution is shown in figure 2.3 alongside
the bribe function when costs are uniformly distributed. The mathematical expression is
Figure 2.3. Comparison of bribe functions-uniform vs beta cost types























provided by equation (2.28) in appendix 2.B.
As shown in the diagram, skewing the cost type to the left (i.e. a concentration of less
efficient firms in the game) reduces the bribe payment by low cost firms while it increases
bribe payments by high cost firms. This outcome follows from the properties of a beta(4,2)
distribution. This distribution has a long left tail. Therefore the marginal distribution of
the cost type, hence the marginal benefit of bribery, is very small in the left tail. Since
the optimal bribe equates the marginal cost to marginal benefit, a smaller bribe will be
optimal in the left tail i.e. low cost firms offer low bribes.
On the other hand, the marginal benefit of bribery is very high in the upper tail hence
firms have an incentive to offer high bribes. Consequently, high cost firms offer higher
bribes than when the cost type is uniformly distributed. Thus the bribe function for high
cost firms when the cost type has a beta(4,2) distribution is above the bribe function when
cost types are uniformly distributed. Ultimately, high cost firms win the subsidy but pay
more for it, while some low cost firms pay lower bribes but still purchase the input at the
market price.
2.4 Discussion
The above analysis shows that in a symmetric equilibrium, competitive bribery allocates
the subsidy to firms which obtain higher rents from the subsidy. This outcome is consistent
with a typical result in auction theory that bidders with the highest valuation win the
auctioned object whenever the bidding strategy is symmetric. Whether the allocation is
socially optimal depends on the alignment of rents valuations to society’s preferences. If
the rents valuation coincides with society’s preferences, a socially optimal outcome ensues,
otherwise the outcome will be suboptimal. For example, in the fixed price contract game,
rents are higher for low cost firms and society also prefers an allocation to the lowest cost
firms. The outcome from competitive bribery is thus efficient.
In contrast, an input subsidy generates higher rents to inefficient firms (high cost produc-
ers) who then offer higher bribes and win the subsidy yet society prefers an allocation to
low cost firms. Therefore, allocation through competitive bribery is not socially optimal
for the case of an input subsidy analyzed above. Inefficient producers get the subsidized
input at the expense of more efficient producers in this case. Using this result, combined
with Lien’s (1990) result showing inefficient allocation in the case of asymmetry due to












2. Bribery and efficiency: A counter-example from rents generated by market distortions
Claim Competitive bribery under incomplete information is only efficient under the fol-
lowing conditions: i) Bribers have a common information set and share common
beliefs, ii) The bribee allocates the object solely on the basis of the bribe size i.e.
there is no bribe discrimination and iii) The bribers’ valuation of rents is aligned to
society’s preferences.
The first condition in this claim follows from a necessary condition that bidders assume a
common distribution of the valuation (the cost type in this case) hence adopt a common
probability φ(b) of winning, in order to obtain a symmetric equilibrium. It follows from the
general auction theory result that asymmetric equilibria is inefficient. The second follows
from Lien’s (1990) result that allocation is inefficient when the bureaucrat discriminates
bribes while the third condition follows from the analysis in this paper. This implies that
efficient allocation under competitive bribery is a particular rather than a general outcome.
The first two conditions generally do not hold in practice due to favoritism, nepotism, bribe
discrimination and other asymmetries. In addition this chapter demonstrated that market
distortions generate rents which are misaligned to society’s preferences. Since distortions
are highly prevalent and a major source of rents too, the following remark based on the
above claim, can be made.
Remark The efficient outcome from competitive bribery models is sensitive to the model
set-up, it cannot therefore be generalized.
Indeed, it is easier to think of circumstances in which competitive bribery is inefficient.
Kaufmann (1997) gives an example of India where firms, after realizing that junior of-
ficials cannot facilitate faster processing of their documents, pay them to further delay
the processing of rivals’ documents instead. A similar inefficient outcome can be envis-
aged from Grossman and Helpman (1994). They predict that when some special interest
groups can organize and lobby for tariff protection, the political equilibrium that emerges
favors protectionism rather than efficient means. These organized groups are likely to be
monopolies and oligopolies which are inefficient (see Oslon 1971).
In developing countries, lobbying might take the form of outright bribery of politicians.
Firms bribe politicians to obtain legislation that guarantees monopoly rents, higher tariffs
in their sectors while advocating for price ceilings in others and purchasing of parastatals
below their market values during privatization and indigenization programs. Even if such
bribery is competitive, the outcome is unlikely to be efficient.
Considering that i) bureaucrats are more likely to discriminate bribes and preside over













one should expect bribery to be inefficient even if it is competitive. This is likely the
case in licensing for natural resources or cases of favoritism in awarding of large scale
public projects. Other examples in which competitive bribery is inefficient includes job
selection and the justice system. There is no guarantee that the best qualified candidate is
awarded the job if selection is on the basis of bribery nor is there reason to believe that the
innocent part will offer a higher bribe to the judge. In fact, it is the least qualified and the
guilty who have greater incentives to offer bigger bribes. Thus conditions in reality make
inefficient outcomes from competitive bribery more likely. Therefore, the generalization
that competitive bribery is efficient is misleading.
2.5 Conclusion
The chapter highlighted the debate on the economic consequences of corruption. It then
presented a counter argument to the notion that that competitive bribery is efficient. The
chapter applied auction theory to demonstrate that competitive bribery is generally ineffi-
cient and that the “efficiency outcome” is sensitive to the model set-up. Using the example
of an input price subsidy, it showed that when the valuation of rents is misaligned to so-
ciety’s preference, an inefficient allocation ensues. Competitive bribery is only efficient
when there is alignment of rents valuation to society’s preferences and bribery strategies
are symmetric. Thus conclusions that bribery is efficient are particular rather than gen-
eral cases in reality. The results of the chapter imply that generalizing the efficiency of
competitive bribery is misleading. In fact, competitive bribery is generally inefficient.
The use of rents from input subsidies in this chapter highlights that market distortions at-
tract bribery which leads to losses in efficiency. The bribes are collected by the bureaucrat.
So far, a passive bureaucrat who does not set policy has been assumed. If the bureaucrat
designs policy or shares bribes with the policy maker according to some institutional ar-
rangement, he and the policy maker have an incentive to act strategically and maximize
the appropriation of rents. This entails increasing the magnitude of distortions despite the
associated welfare losses. The bureaucrat and policy maker will only care for the welfare
losses if they affect the likelihood of continued extraction of rents. Therefore observed
distortions are an outcome of the interaction between private bureaucratic incentives and
the quality of electoral institutions which determine the likelihood of continued extraction
of rents.












2. Bribery and efficiency: A counter-example from rents generated by market distortions
can only keep his office by maintaining distortions at levels acceptable to a simple major-
ity of voters in a complete democracy. However when democratic institutions are weak,
the policy maker has a second instrument at his disposal. This instrument is electoral
fraud/manipulation. With an additional instrument at hand, the policy maker is able to
extract higher bribes by setting market distortions at higher levels than possible in a com-













2.A. The general cost function
2.A The general cost function
Assume a total cost function in equation (2.21), where x ∈ [xm, xs] , ciqi are costs from
other inputs and f(qi) is such that f ′(qi) < 0; f ′′(qi) ≥ 0. Thus the cost component of
the input X is decreasing in output. This cost function has a U−shaped average cost
function.
TC = ciqi + f(qi)x (2.21)
Denote the average cost function by AC, then













f ′′(qi)qi − f ′(qi)q2i − 2f(qi)qi
q4i
(2.24)





firms are price takers, then the first order condition is given in 2.25.
p = ci + f
′(qi)x (2.25)
This implies that a low cost firm produces more output in equilibrium. To see this clearly,
consider the first order conditions for firm 1 and firm 2 with respective costs types c1 and
c2 such that c1 < c2 . The first order condition implies that
c2 − c1 = [f ′(q1)− f ′(q2)]x
If c1 < c2, f ′(q1) − f ′(q2) > 0 since f ′(qi) < 0, this implies that f ′(q2) is greater in
magnitude than f ′(q1). Since f
′′
(qi) > 0, it follows that q1 > q2 in equilibrium. The
corresponding profit function is π(q, x) = pq − cq − f(q)x and πx(q, x) = −f(q) < 0. A
reduction in the price of X increases profits. It is therefore intuitive for government to
subsidize the price of input X and prioritize low cost producers when the subsidy cannot












2. Bribery and efficiency: A counter-example from rents generated by market distortions
the low cost producer since f ′(q) < 0 and the low cost producer’s output is higher. The
competitive bribery strategies will thus be similar to those discussed in the paper. In fact,
the cost function used in the paper is a simple version of this general cost function where
f(qi) = α and one can define α = 1q for example.
2.B Calculating the optimal bribe with beta cost types
Assume that the cost type has a beta distribution over the support [0, 1] such that
f(α|4, 2) = Γ(6)
Γ(4)Γ(4)
(1− α)α3. The pdf f(α) and cdf F (α) of the cost type are:
















Substituting for these expressions in equation 2.5 and for k = 2 and n = 3 gives





























Electoral accountability and incentives for
market distortions
3.1 Introduction
Market distortions are implemented in varying forms and magnitudes in different countries.
The distortions are quite high in some countries leading to high levels of corruption and
huge welfare losses, yet they persist over long periods. Among popular explanations of this
phenomenon is that market distortions are an outcome of aggregation of private interests
by the state. Distortions are a culmination of lobbying from special interest groups in this
regard (Bates 1987, Grossman & Helpman 1994). They cannot be reversed once they are
implemented (Coate & Morris 1999). A second explanation is based on the political use
of economic inefficiency. This suits an autonomous state that dictates policy. In this case,
distortions are an outcome of tactical redistribution of excludable benefits by politicians
to key constituencies in order to secure political power (Cox & McCubbins 1986, Dixit &
Londregan 1996).
These explanations preclude the motive of appropriation of rents from market distortions
for private financial gain. They assume that politicians’ policy choices are driven only by
the need for political control. However, the previous chapter showed that market distor-
tions attract bribes which accrue to people in office. Thus office bearers benefit financially
from rent generating distortions. By focusing on political incentives only, explanations












3. Electoral accountability and incentives for market distortions
tions. They rule out glaring distortions which make an overwhelming majority of voters
worse-off because such distortions are political suicide.
However, such glaring distortions are observed in reality. The overvaluation of the Zim-
babwean dollar (the black market premium was 24 000% in January 2008 (BBC 2008))
and price controls led to empty shelves and an inflation rate of 100 580.2 % in January
2008 for example (CSO 2008). Yet these distortions persisted. At the same time, the
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) spent USD25 million, financed from inflation, on an
agriculture mechanization programme that offered free agricultural implements to farmers.
Only people in positions of influence benefited from this programme at a greater cost to
society (Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 2006). A similar situation was experienced in Zambia
towards the end of former President Kaunda’s reign and in East-European countries dur-
ing late 80s. In these examples, policy choices resulted in intolerable levels of corruption
and welfare losses which cannot be justified on the basis of attracting voters. There should
be another motive for their existence.
These distortions were sustained for the financial rents they brought to office bearers.
Models of electoral accountability take into account financial rent seeking motives of pol-
icy makers. They predict that policy makers extract rents up a level just acceptable to a
simple majority. This prediction implies that a majority of voters in countries with high
distortions like Zimbabwe, find them acceptable despite huge welfare losses such distor-
tions impose. This is implausible since rioting takes place in most countries with such
distortions. An alternative explanation to the existence of high distortions is needed. It
is offered in this chapter.
The existence of high distortions is attributed to the maximization of appropriation of
rents from market distortions by self enriching policy makers when electoral institutions
are weak. Market distortions generate rent seeking opportunities. Higher distortions
bring greater financial benefits to the incumbent through corruption. However, high mar-
ket distortions and subsequent welfare losses they bring increase political pressure. When
electoral institutions are strong, the incumbent faces full political pressure brought by wel-
fare losses from high distortions. He faces binding political constraints hence he distorts
less. If electoral institutions are weak, the incumbent can easily manipulate the electoral
process. The incumbent is insulated against any political pressure arising from the welfare
losses from market distortions. He is able to maximize on financial rents by raising the
levels of distortions. Therefore high distortions are attributable to poor electoral institu-
tions which erodes electoral accountability. This enables self enriching policy makers to












3.2. Politics and policy choice – A review
This argument is confirmed by empirical evidence on exchange rate overvaluation in Sub-
Saharan Africa during 1980- 1998. The results show that on average, complete dicta-
torships will overvalue by between 22.4 and 26.6 percentage points more than complete
democracies with similar economic characteristics. It is found that exchange rates are
less likely to be overvalued in democratic regimes than in autocracies. This explains high
distortions in a country like Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2009. The chapter is organized
as follows: Section 3.2 reviews the literature on politics and policy choice. Section 3.3
outlines the theoretical model. Section 3.4 empirically tests the theory on exchange rate
overvaluation in Sub–Saharan Africa. Section 3.5 discusses the findings and relates them
to events in Zimbabwe. Section 3.6 summarizes the findings and concludes the chapter.
3.2 Politics and policy choice – A review
Governments sometimes introduce suboptimal policies that persist over time. Various
arguments have been made in an attempt to explain these policies. The first assumes
that policy makers seek policies that maximize social welfare. Inefficiencies are not inten-
tional but simply a result of a single institution attempting to pursue multiple and often
counteracting objectives. This kind of assumption is inherent in the discretion versus
rules literature (Kydland & Prescott 1977, Barro & Gordon 1983, Rogoff 1985, Alesina
& Tabellini 1987). The policy maker’s objective function and the social welfare function
are the same in most of these cases. Nevertheless, active policy manipulation leads to an
inflation bias although the policy makers’ objective is noble.
Other examples have been mentioned in Bates (1987). It is often highlighted that price
controls in agriculture were meant to promote industrialization by providing cheap inputs
and reducing the cost of labor for the industrial sector. Exchange rate overvaluation could
be seen as an attempt to reduce the cost of importing critical intermediate goods and
essentials like oil while high tariffs are an attempt at infant industry protection. Thus
whatever negative impact such policies have on welfare, they are initially made to improve
it. If this were the case, one expects policy reversals once the negative effects of the policy
become apparent.
The second explanation is found in models of special interest groups. It is assumed that
policy makers care only about political power. Their policy choices are meant to maximize
political gain. They respond mainly to organized groups’ concerns since these are a major












3. Electoral accountability and incentives for market distortions
made in Grossman & Helpman’s (1994) “protection for sale” paper. They set up a model
in which special interest groups lobby for protection by offering political contributions to
the incumbent government. Protectionism reduces welfare of people but the incumbent
needs the funds for campaigning to win people’s vote. Thus the incumbent government
has to choose a policy that maximizes its welfare which is a function of contributions and
welfare of people. They show that when some groups can lobby while others don’t, the
incumbent chooses a trade policy that protects the lobbyist. It is also shown that lobbies
may prefer inefficient means of transfers (i.e. protectionism) than efficient means.
According to this argument, economic policy is driven primarily by the agenda of special
interest groups. This has been applied to the determination of the exchange rate regime in
literature on the political economy of exchange rates (Hefeker 2000, Broz & Frieden 2001).
It is argued that observed exchange rate regimes or levels are determined by special interest
groups through their political influence rather than overall economic merit. This can be
illustrated in the choice between exchange rate stability through pegging versus monetary
flexibility. The tradeables sector prefers exchange rate stability while the non tradable
sector prefers monetary flexibility. The two sectors lobby for their interests. Similarly
exporters and import competing industries would lobby for a depreciation while importers
lobby for an appreciation.
A practical example is demonstrated in the endogenous switching of the exchange rate
regime in Korea (Kim & Kim 2005). Kim & Kim argue that exchange rate regime switches
are an endogenous outcome of bureaucratic incentives derived from special interest groups.
Bureaucrats derive benefits from lobbying by special interest groups who have differing
preferences on the level of the exchange rate. The special groups are primarily concerned
about the level of the exchange rate rather than the regime. However, manipulating the
exchange rate is costly to the bureaucrat. The cost, both political and financial, varies
with the exchange rate regime. The bureaucrat chooses a regime that minimizes the cost
of exchange rate manipulation in response to benefits from special interests given constant
flows of lobbying funds across regimes.
Kim & Kim (2005) test this argument on the regime switch to the market average regime
(MAR) in 1990 by Korea. Their first model results show that both export and import
pressure groups significantly influenced the exchange rate. Their second model supports
the argument that changes in the political landscape (i.e. an increase in electoral account-
ability) in the late 1980s increased the political cost of manipulating the exchange rate to
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A lot of emphasis in these models is placed on organized groups or ability to organize and
neglects large unorganized groups. This underestimates the power of unorganized groups’
votes as reward or punishment for good behavior (Wittman 1989, Arnold 1990). Since
groups are first movers, the models also imply a subordinate state (Rodrick 1992). Market
distortions are a result of the incapacitation of the subordinate state by special interest
groups in this context. This is not applicable in an autonomous state which dictates policy
and private agents respond to that policy. This leads us to the third line of argument to
explain choices of economic policies.
This third explanation explores the political use of economic inefficiency. The policy
maker is motivated by political control and he is the first mover, setting policy strate-
gically to induce groups to conform to his intentions. Therefore, politicians may choose
inefficient economic policies for political control (Bates 1987, Cox &McCubbins 1986, Dixit
& Londregan 1995, Dixit & Londregan 1996, Coate & Morris 1999). They use excludable
and often inefficient transfers to benefit key constituents- either core supporters in some
models or swing voters in others.
Dixit & Londregan (1996) provides a general framework for explaining redistributive poli-
tics. They argue that pork-barrel politics emanates from voters’ willingness to compromise
on their principles for particularistic voting. Increasing transfers to one group happens
at the expense of higher taxes to another. Although a party can fully tax, transfers that
reach particular groups have leaks. These leaks vary from group to group and may differ
systematically from one party to another. Voters have party affinities but also care about
excludable particularistic benefits. There are two parties (R and L) with fixed ideological
positions. Voters comprise identifiable groups which can be distinguished by some par-
ticular characteristic e.g. occupation. Heterogeneity on party affinity within each groups’
voters is permissible but there are systematic differences on party affinities within groups.
A voter with affinity for R in group i may vote for party L if utility from L′s redistributive
policy exceeds that from party R by some threshold level Xi.
Different groups will have different thresholds and responsiveness to changes in consump-
tion, hence different responsiveness to redistribution policies. The model generates either
a swing voter or core voter outcome depending on the underlying conditions. When parties
can redistribute benefits with equal abilities to different groups, a swing voter outcome
ensues. Groups with relatively many moderates, more indifferent to party ideology rela-
tive to particularistic gains or that have high marginal utility of income hence more likely
to compromise, are the target of redistributive politics. On the other hand, a core voter












3. Electoral accountability and incentives for market distortions
different groups. Parties target benefits to their core constituencies in this case.
The above theory implies that distortions are a tool for attracting support from certain con-
stituencies. Politicians thus distort not for private financial gain, but only to attract votes
from certain constituencies. Bates (1987) points to underpricing of agriculture commodi-
ties in countries with urban-political bases as a good example. Another example includes
underpricing in share issue privatization in mass privatizations by the right to enlist sup-
port from the left (Boycko, Shleifer & Vishny 1994, Schmidt 2000, Biais & Perotti 2002)1.
This argument excludes private financial benefits to politicians themselves. Consideration
for private financial gains may be the underlying motive behind underpricing of state en-
terprizes in Africa. Craig (2000) observed that some branded Zambia’s privatization as a
looting exercise for example.
Models of lobbying and tactical redistribution cannot explain distortions that bring large
welfare losses to a majority of voters. Such distortions will push this majority to the
opposition leading to electoral defeat in a complete democracy. Limiting politicians’ in-
centives only to securing political control thus rules out any distortions that are obviously
detrimental to the majority voters. Therefore, excessive distortions that we sometimes
observe are inconsistent with pure desire for political control. An adequate theory should
thus capture other incentives and institutional arrangements that permits the existence
of excessive distortions which benefit only a few. The next section offers an alternative
argument which extends the politicians’ incentives to include private financial benefits in
a weak institutional environment.
3.3 A model of bureaucratic incentives
I intend to model an incumbent who designs an inefficient policy for private financial
gain first and foremost but benefits specific groups to appease them and ensure political
control in a weak institutional environment. A model of electoral accountability emerges
as a natural option for analyzing the incumbent’s financial incentive to distort. Once in
power, office bearers have monopoly power to allocate resources. Left alone, self interest
dictates the use of this power to their own ends at great cost to society. There is a moral
hazard involved which can be controlled through electoral accountability (Persson, Roland
& Tabellini 1997).
1See also Kim & Kim (2007) on the choice of the discount window instead of open market operations.
Although inefficient (Poole 1993) the discount window ensues political control. Also see Clark & Hallerberg












3.3. A model of bureaucratic incentives
Ferejohn (1986) proposed an electoral model in which voters evaluate, then reward or
punish office bearers on the basis of actual performance while in office. This motivates
office bearers to please the electorate. This is inherent in traditional political business
cycle literature based on either retrospective voting (pioneered by Nordhaus 1975) or
rational voters with imperfect information about the incumbent’s competence (Rogoff
& Sibert 1988, Rogoff 1990). In these models, the incumbent undertakes opportunistic
behavior either to please retrospective voters or to signal his competence if voters are
rational. In short, the incumbent believes that his current performance influences the
political outcome.
Empirical evidence of active policy manipulation in electoral years in both developed
countries (Alesina 1987, Nordhaus 1989, Alesina, Cohen & Roubini 1992, Drazen 2000)
and developing countries (Schuknecht 1996, Block 2002, Dreher & Vaubel 2004, Shi &
Svensson 2006) suggests that politicians believe in electoral accountability. A reinforcing
finding is that good economic conditions help keep incumbents in power (Nannestad &
Paldam 1994, Price 1997, Gelineau & Remmer 2006). This suggests that to some extent,
voters hold politicians accountable for their performance while in office.
A model of electoral accountability best captures the political behavior in Africa and
other developing countries. In developing countries, elections normally serve as referenda
of incumbent governments’ performance (Ka & van de Walle 1994, Block 2002). Ideological
partisan differences in terms of right and left are also less clear cut in developing countries
(Shi & Svensson 2003). Consequently, politicians typically make policies that maximize
political survival based on their perceptions on political risk associated with given policies.
This justifies the use of an electoral accountability model in this paper.
Some models have used an electoral accountability framework to merge politicians’ pri-
vate financial and political motives for rent seeking (Coate & Morris 1999, Persson &
Tabellini 2000, Aidt 2003). However, they fail to encompass some critical issues. These
models assume a mature democracy (or more generally strong institutions) such that vot-
ers are fully able to express their displeasure into votes against the incumbent. Since
electoral accountability is rendered ineffective in immature democracies or weak institu-
tional environments, politicians face smaller trade-offs for their rent seeking activities.
Failure to take the quality of institutions into account issues is likely to understate the
level of distortions that politicians choose.
Electoral accountability models implicitly assume a representative voter or that all voters
coordinate on a particular voting rule. However, large groups’ inability to coordinate is
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for controlling politicians than observed in practice. In addition the models overlook
the importance of special groups politics for either influencing the policy or their use in
maintaining political control. However, Potters & Sloff (1996) note from literature that
special interest groups influence politicians policy choices on specific and narrow issues
that bring concentrated benefits but whose costs are widely distributed. The model below
takes these issues into account.
3.3.1 The model
Consider an economy with a presidential system where power is concentrated in a single
individual. The incumbent considers the possibility of intervening in markets for the
purposes of rent seeking. Distortions of magnitude d generate rents r(d) where r′(0) > 0
and r′′(d) < 0. These distortions reduce welfare by w(0)−w(d), where w(0) is the welfare
without intervention and w(d) is welfare under intervention. The politician is fully aware
of the negative welfare effects of the distortions and that excessive welfare loses increase
political pressure–possibly leading to an electoral defeat. The incumbent thus faces a
trade-off between raising rents in the current period and reducing the probability of re-
election thereby reducing expected future rents.
Voting rule
Voters consider the incumbent (policy maker) and the opponent as identical in all respects.
They use their votes to punish the incumbent for excessive loss of welfare by voting him
out, or rewarding him for good behavior by keeping him in office. They vote the incumbent
out whenever welfare loses exceed their respective threshold points. Formally put, voter i
will vote the incumbent out when w(0) − w(d) > Xi where Xi ≥ 0 is voter i ’s threshold
for tolerable loss in welfare. This allows for differences in threshold points among voters so
they need not coordinate on a particular voting/punishment rule. Voter coordination has
been a bone of contention with electoral accountability models. Also, such a specification
can accommodate partisan politics. In which caseXi reflects voter i ’ s sympathy or affinity
for the incumbent. Thus the probability of voter i voting for the incumbent is given by
(3.1), where F (x) ≡ F (w(0)− w(d)) is the cumulative density of Xi.












3.3. A model of bureaucratic incentives
In the strictest sense, F (x) should be a probability conditioned on all other factors (state
of affairs) that affect voter decisions but are not directly analyzed here. This voting rule is
consistent with the notion that voters vote on the overall economic performance instead of
personal circumstances (Lewis-Beck 1988, Nannestad & Paldam 1994). The greater is the
welfare loss caused by the distortion, the lower the reelection prospects of the incumbent.
When institutions are weak, the incumbent can mitigate against electoral pressure by
devoting a portion of his rents, c, to manipulating the electoral process. The incumbent’s
success at manipulating the electoral process is given by a function λ(c), where λ(0) = 0,
λ′(c) ≥ 0, λ′′(c) ≤ 0 and lim
c→∞
λ(c) = 1. Spending on electoral manipulation increases the
chances of winning the election, but at a decreasing rate, such that an incumbent will
have to devote an unlimited amount of resources to be absolutely assured of victory. Thus
0 ≥ λ(c) ≤ 1, noting that λ(c) = 0 ∀c implies that electoral manipulation is completely
ineffective, as with the case of very strong institutions. For two countries, a and b, λa(c) >
λb(c) ∀c implies that it is easier to successfully manipulate elections in country a than in
country b.
Electoral manipulation is modeled as the alteration of the voting rule in (3.1) to become
(3.2). Equation (3.2) says that voter manipulation increases the level of voter tolerance
for welfare reduction. It raises their thresholds levels so that voters become more patient
and reduce their propensity to punish. One may interpret this as voter intimidation,
vote buying or vote rigging. This effectively reduces the probability of voting for the
opponent at all levels of price distortions by subverting the ability of citizens to express
their preferences over policy.
Pr([w(0)− w(d)] < Xi
[1− λ(c)]
) = 1− F ([1− λ(c)]x(d)) (3.2)
The distribution of voter thresholds levels, hence the shape of F (x(p)) has a critical bearing
on the winning formula. For example, when ethnicity has a large influence on voting
patterns (i.e. the case of identity voting), the incumbent is able to distort more and win if
he belongs to a large ethnic group. The framing of the voting rule also admits for ideology
to play an important role whereby socialist societies will accept higher levels of distortions
before they vote the incumbent out. In both these cases, electoral manipulation may not
be necessary for the incumbent to set higher distortions.
While acknowledging the importance of these factors, the chapter focuses on the effect of
absence of electoral accountability. It concentrates on the possibility that desired rents re-












3. Electoral accountability and incentives for market distortions
towards electoral manipulation. Such a process may involve paying-off the military, po-
lice and some militia to intimidate voters as witnessed in Zimbabwe in the past decade
(Bracking 2005). In other countries, this may involve outright buying of voters. While in
others, incumbents hand pick the electoral commission and give them huge perks to sway
the results in the incumbents’ favor.
Incumbent’s maximization problem
In period t, the incumbent’s objective is to maximize his indirect utility function, Vt,
taking into consideration the behavior of voters. Assume that once booted out of office,
the incumbent does not earn any new income. The incumbent’s maximization problem
is thus given by (3.3) where ωt is the official reward of being in office, r(dt) are rents
from distortions in the current period, β is a discount factor and E(Vt+1) is the expected
indirect utility of being in office in the next term. We thus have an electoral accountability
model similar to Ferejohn (1986) and Persson & Tabellini (2000). Unlike these models,





{Vt = ωt + r(dt) + β[1− F ([1− λ(ct)]x(dt))]E(Vt+1)} (3.3)
The next period’s expected rents from office, hence E(Vt+1) can be a function of choices dt
and ct in principle. While this is generaly true, I shall assume that dt and ct affect future
rents only through their effect on the probability of reelection in order to simplify the
analysis. The incumbent’s maximization problem is to choose dt and ct that maximizes
his utility. There is a trade-off involved. Raising dt increases rents but reduces expected
future rents due to a decline in the probability of re-election. The incumbent has to
mitigate against the declining popularity by spending ct on electoral manipulation.
3.3.2 Characterizing the equilibrium distortion
The first order conditions for the maximization problem presented in (3.3) with respect to
dt and ct are given by expressions (3.4) and (3.5) respectively, where f(·) is the probability
density function of Xi.
dVt
∂d∗t












3.3. A model of bureaucratic incentives
dVt
∂c∗t
= −1 + βtλ′(c∗t )f(·)x(d∗t )E(Vt+1) = 0 (3.5)
The first order condition in (3.4) implies that the incumbent distorts up to point where
the marginal increase in rents equals to the marginal loss in expected future rents. Note
that λ(ct) = 0 ∀c when electoral manipulation is not possible. In this case, (3.4) reduces
to (3.6). A comparison of expressions (3.4) and (3.6) shows that the marginal loss in
expected future rents caused by increasing distortions in the current term is [1 − λ(ct)]
times lower when electoral manipulation is possible than when it is not possible, yet the
marginal benefit is the same. As illustrated in figure 3.1, this implies that equilibrium
distortions will be higher when electoral manipulation is possible (i.e. whenever λ(ct) > 0
for ct > 0). Figure 3.1 illustrates that d0t , the equilibrium distortions that corresponds to
higher marginal losses in expected future rents in the absence of electoral manipulation, is
lower than d∗t , the equilibrium distortion when the marginal expected loss in future rents
is lowered by electoral manipulation.
dVt
∂d0t
= r′(d0t )− βtf(·)x′(d0t )E(Vt+1) = 0 (3.6)




































3. Electoral accountability and incentives for market distortions
The higher the expenditure on electoral manipulation, hence the closer λ(c∗t ) is to 1,
the lower is the marginal loss in expected future rents. Therefore an incumbent is able
to raise distortions by investing in electoral manipulation. However spending on electoral
manipulation is a cost that has to be balanced against the increase in future expected rents
benefits it brings. This trade off is shown in (3.5), the FOC with respect to expenditure
on electoral manipulation.
Expression (3.5) implies that an incumbent spends on electoral manipulation up to a
point where the marginal increase in expected future rents due to an additional unit of
money spend on electoral manipulation [βtλ′(c∗t )f(·)x(d∗t )E(Vt+1)], equals the marginal
cost (which is equal to 1). It also implies that the incumbent will find it optimal to
manipulate the electoral process whenever λ′(c) > 0 for some c > 0. The equilibrium
distortions will also be higher by implication.
This result implies that when institutions are weak, the incumbent always chooses higher
distortions and then circumvents the electoral process. Thus excessive distortions are
explained by institutional weakness that erode electoral accountability hence an absence
of a mechanism to control moral hazard by self enriching politicians once they are in
office. The model outlined above thus offers a plausible explanation of the existence high
distortions, with overwhelming adverse effects on the majority of the population, that are
witnessed in some developing countries.
3.4 Application to exchange rate overvaluation in Sub–
Saharan Africa
The result from the theoretical model outlined above showed that incumbent governments
in countries with weak institutions are able and will distort more for the purposes of
rent seeking. This implies the following testable hypothesis in applied research: Less
democratic countries have higher distortions .
This thesis tests this hypothesis on the exchange rate policy in Sub–Saharan Africa for the
period 1980 – 1998. Most countries in Sub–Saharan Africa have poor political institutions
and have tended to over value the exchange rate –sometimes excessively. The extent of
over-valuation is reflected in the parallel market premium. The parallel market premium
was in excess of 100% about 30% of the time during this period. There are 12 episodes of












3.4. Application to exchange rate overvaluation in Sub–Saharan Africa
persistence is longer in some countries and shorter in others, while some other countries
never had excessive premiums at all. There is variation in both the magnitude and per-
sistence of exchange rate distortions. Democratic institutions have suffered different fates
over the same period as well. This motivates an assessment of whether differences in the
quality of democratic institutions influenced variations in exchange rate overvaluation as
hypothesized above.
An overvalued exchange rate generates rent seeking opportunities for those with access
to cheap foreign currency. These are mostly people in positions of influence. The foreign
currency can either be disposed off on the parallel market at a premium or used to import
luxury commodities at a low cost. The premium is higher and the cost of importing lower
when the exchange rate is highly overvalued. However, the cost of excessive over-valuation
is usually great. It harms the export sector, lowers returns to investment and increases
structural bottlenecks that consequently reduce output and employment. This generates
political pressure. One expects the incumbent to maintain low exchange rate distortions
or restrict persistence of excessive distortions unless he has other means to mitigate this
pressure.
3.4.1 Empirical estimation
Define lxrate as log of the parallel market rate to the official exchange rate ratio and polity2
as a measure of political regime characteristics hence the quality of electoral institutions.
To test the first hypothesis one estimates the following econometric model
lxrateit = γPolity2it + βxit + µi + εit (3.7)
where country and year are denoted by subscripts i and t respectively, xit is a vector
of controls including the constant, µi are unobserved country specific effects and εit is a
random disturbance which varies with time and country. Given the macro nature of the
data, it is more appropriate to estimate the dynamic model in (3.8) where γ1 is expected
to be negative. Furthermore, a dynamic model is theoretically appealing is one assumes
that future rents are endogenous to the choice of current period distortions.
lxrateit = δlxrateit−1 + γ1Polity2it + βxit + µi + εit (3.8)












3. Electoral accountability and incentives for market distortions
OLS estimator is biased and inconsistent. Similarly, the random effects estimator is also
biased and inconsistent. By construction lxrateit−1− lxratei is correlated with εit−εi even
if the disturbances are not serially correlated since εi contains εit−1. Therefore, the within
fixed effects estimator is also biased (see Nickell 1981). The fixed effects estimator however
becomes consistent as T →∞. The alternative is to apply a first difference transformation
on (3.8) to wipe out the fixed effects and then use IV estimation with lxrateit−2 as an
instrument for ∆lxrateit−1 (see Anderson & Hsiao 1981, Arellano 1989). Although this
produces consistent estimates, they are not necessarily efficient.
Various alternatives have been proposed to improve the precision of these estimates. All of
them are GMM based procedures that utilize additional moment restrictions to estimate
the parameters in (3.8). Let yit = lxrateit, and wit = (polity2, xit), θ = (γ1 β)
′ , then (3.8)
can be rewritten as (3.9), with the following assumptions i) E(µi) = E(εit) = E(µiεit) = 0,
ii) errors are serially uncorrelated (i.e. E(εisεit) = 0 for s 6= t) and iii) predetermined initial
conditions (i.e. E(yi1εit) = 0 for t = 2, ...., T ).
yit = δyit−1 + witθ + µi + εit (3.9)
Also applicable to this analysis is the assumption of presence of fixed effects (i.e. E(witµi) 6=
0). An additional assumption is that either wit are strictly exogenous (i.e. E(wisεit) = 0
∀t, s), predetermined (i.e. E(wisεit) = 0 for s ≤ t), endogenous (i.e. E(wisεit) = 0 for
s < t) or that a subset, weit, of wit is endogenous. For expositional purposes, assume that
wit is predetermined.
The above assumptions imply that both wit and yit−1, are correlated with µi. To eliminate
the unobserved individual effects, (3.9) is first differenced to give (3.10)
∆yit = δ∆yit−1 + ∆witθ + ∆εit (3.10)
The assumption of predetermined initial conditions implies the moment conditions E(yi,t−s∆εit) =
0 for t = 3, ....T and s ≥ 2 while that of predetermined wit imply E(wi,t−s∆εit) = 0 for
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that can be expressed as E(Z ′i∆εi) = 0 where
Zi =

yi1 wi1 wi2 0 0 0 0 0 ... 0 ... 0 0 ... 0
0 0 0 yi1 yi2 wi1 wi2 wi3 ... 0 ... 0 0 ... 0
. . . . . . . . ... . . . .
. . . . . . . . ... . . . .
. . . . . . . . ... . . . .
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ... yi1 ... yi,T−2 wi1 ... wi,T−1

If instead an endogenous wit is assumed, that would imply E(wi,t−s∆εit) = 0 for t = 3, ....T
and s ≥ 2 hence the matrix Zi will be adjusted accordingly by deleting the columns with
the wi,t−1 as the last non-zero element. A similar principle applies if only a subset weit of
wit is endogenous while another set wpit is predetermined. In this case E(wei,t−s∆εit) = 0
for t = 3, ....T and s ≥ 2 while E(wpi,t−s∆εit) = 0 for t = 2, ....T and s ≥ 1. Expressing
wit = {wpit weit }, then Zi above will be adjusted accordingly by deleting only columns with
wei,t−1 as the last non zero element.
Let α = ( δ θ )
′and Xit = (yi,t−1, wit), then the sample analogue for the moment condi-







i∆εi(α) = 0. The GMM estimator for (3.10) is thus
given by (3.11) for some positive definite weighting matrix WN .






























Different choices of WN produce alternative GMM estimators. The Arellano-Bond one






−1 where H is a T − 2 square matrix with twos
in the main diagonal, minus ones in the subdiagonals and zeros elsewhere. The two step








−1 where ε̂i is a consistent estimate of εi
obtained in a first step estimation.
The two step estimator is asymptotically more efficient than the one step estimator since
it uses an optimal weighting matrix. However the asymptotic variance of the two step
estimator maybe unreliable in finite samples because it neglects the variation introduced












3. Electoral accountability and incentives for market distortions
(1998) observe from Monte Carlo simulations that t-tests based on the one-step estimator
have the correct empirical level while those based on the two step estimator tend to
over reject, especially when errors are non-normal or heteroskedastic. Also, Monte Carlo
simulations by Judson & Owen (1999) indicate that the one-step estimator out performs
the two step estimator. Given these observations and following recommendations from
Judson & Owen, the one-step GMM estimator shall be used here2.
Other issues arise with the above estimators. Firstly, the above procedure is valid only
if there is no second order serial correlation. This can be tested using the Arellano-Bond
test for second order serial correlation in the first differences. Secondly, the number of
instruments grows rapidly with T if all available lagged instruments are used. Therefore,
there is a danger of over fitting when T is moderately large relative to N . One should test
for over identification. A Sargan test for over identification is utilized for this purpose.
This test is reliable for the two step GMM. However, it has a “strong tendency to over
reject in the presence of heteroskedasticity” in the one step estimator and no robust χ2
Sargan test based on the one step GMM is available (Arellano & Bond 1991)[pp 282].
Conditional logit model
Polity2 increases as democratization increases. One expects γ to be negative and signifi-
cant. However, such an effect may be a reflection of other factors. For example, it might
be the case that countries with poor institutions have poor policy makers. In this case,
even though rent seeking might not be the objective of exchange rate over-valuation, dis-
tortions can still be observed for other reasons. Thus a negative γ is also consistent with
a benevolent politician who is not gifted with excellent policy making skills in countries
with poor institutions.
The conditional or fixed effects logit can be used to identify the impact of institutions on
the magnitude of markets distortions. Define $ a threshold level of the parallel market
rate to the official exchange rate ratio. Once the ratio is above $ the distortion is deemed
excessive. Thus a dichotomous variable can be used to represent the extent of distortions.
Call the variable noexcess and let it take a value of 1 when the ratio is below $ and
0 otherwise. For country i in period t, denote noexcess by yit. The fixed effects logit
2A more efficient estimator, especially as the autoregressive parameter approaches unity, is the systems
GMM (SYS-GMM). This imposes an additional initial condition restriction that E(∆yi2µi) = 0. The SYS-
GMM estimator is consistent and efficient if this restriction holds but inconsistent when the restriction is
invalid. The restriction holds automatically if the same process has generated the data long enough but is
unreasonable if the 1st observation corresponds to the true start up point as the case with some countries
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To see how this pins down the effects of institutions on the magnitude of distortions,
consider the following example (adapted from Baltagi 2008) for a simple case of two
countries and two periods. For the entire period, a country either has excessive distortions
in both years (hence yi1+yi2 = 0), has no excessive distortions in both years (i.e. yi1+yi2 =
2) or has excessive distortions in only one of the 2 years (i.e. yi1 + yi2 = 1). The first two
cases do not add anything to the conditional log-likelihood since Pr(yi1, yi2|yi1 + yi2) = 1.
Therefore the only observations that matter are given by
Pr(yi1 = 0, yi2 = 1|yi1 + yi2 = 1) and Pr(yi1 = 1, yi2 = 0|yi1 + yi2 = 1)
Only observations from which a country switched either from a policy of excessive distor-
tions to exchange rate alignment (i.e. yi1 = 0, yi2 = 1) or from a policy of exchange rate
alignment to excessive distortions (i.e. yi1 = 1, yi2 = 0) do matter. Thus identification
of the impact of institutions comes from countries that switched from an overvalued ex-
change rate to an appropriately valued exchange rate or vice versa. Therefore the fixed
effects logit can be used to estimate the impact of institutions on the probability that a
country has an aligned exchange rate. From the hypothesis outline above, one expects
that stronger institutions increase the probability of a country having an aligned exchange
rate. The coefficient of polity2 is expected to be positive and significant in the fixed effects
logit model.
3.4.2 Data
The above hypothesis is tested using data from Sub-Saharan African countries outside the
CFA. This analysis excludes the CFA countries because exchange rate manipulation is not
an available instrument at a country level in the monetary union. The sample covers all
countries for which data on the exchange rate premium and indicators of political regime
characteristics are consistently available. The magnitude of the exchange rate distortions
is measured by the ratio of the parallel market rate to the official exchange rate. This












3. Electoral accountability and incentives for market distortions
to 1998.
Summary statistics for this variable are presented in table 3.1. The country mean parallel
to official exchange rate ranges from 1.04 for Mauritius to 349 billion for DR Congo.
Clearly countries like Angola and DR Congo are outliers which will have a big influence
Table 3.1. Summary statistics of political regime characteristics and exchange rate valu-
ation from 1978 to 1998
min max mean max frequency
Country obs polity2 polity2 premiuma premiuma of excessb
Angola 14 -7 0 2.49× 1010 6.67× 1010 14
Botswana 21 7 9 1.17 1.69 0
Burundi 21 -7 0 1.31 1.62 0
DR Congo 21 -9 0 3.49× 1011 1.0× 1012 21
Ethiopia 20 -8 1 2.08 3.39 8
Gambia 21 -7 8 1.07 1.34 0
Ghana 21 -7 6 3.499 22.44 9
Guinea 21 -9 -1 2.84 12.77 8
Kenya 21 -7 -2 1.15 1.58 0
Lesotho 16 -7 8 1.063 1.18 0
Liberia 7 -7 0 32.04 48.5 5
Madagascar 21 -6 9 1.23 2.05 2
Malawi 21 -9 6 1.39 2.23 1
Mauritania 19 -7 -6 1.82 2.69 9
Mauritius 14 9 10 1.04 1.09 0
Mozambique 19 -8 6 8.66 48.23 10
Namibia 2 6 6 1.05 1.06 0
Nigeria 21 -7 7 2.39 4.25 10
Rwanda 21 -7 -6 1.48 2.06 3
Sierra Leone 21 -7 4 1.69 4.05 4
Somalia 12 -7 0 1.58 2.66 2
South Africa 19 4 9 1.07 1.18 0
Sudan 21 -7 7 23.53 151.39 15
Swaziland 14 -10 -9 1.10 1.19 0
Tanzania 21 -7 -1 2.26 4.92 11
Uganda 21 -7 3 215.28 1020.63 12
Zambia 21 -9 6 1.97 7.80 6
Zimbabwe 21 -6 4 1.92 8.23 5
Source: Polity IV data and African Development Indicators
a- Ratio of the black market exchange rate to official exchange rate
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in the regression results and introduce heteroscedasticity. To avoid this, the exchange rate
ratio is winsorized with the 90th percentile as the cut-off point. Thus, all values above
43.2 (the 90th percentile) are replaced by the value 43.2. This ratio is then converted into
natural logarithms.
The definition of institutions is taken in the context of North’s (1990) view of institutions
as “the rules of the game in a society” and March & Oslen’s (2005) definition of institu-
tions as “constitutive rules and practices prescribing behavior for specific actors in specific
situations”. Thus we consider both de jure and de facto institutions. In that context, poor
political institutions as applied in this study, refers to the absence or ineffective de jure
framework and procedures for all citizens to participate and express their preferences over
leaders and policies. It also refers to a de facto lack of guarantee of civil liberties in acts
of political participation or expression of their political preferences. It also includes lack
of or weak constraints on the exercise of power by the executive.
This concept is captured in the Polity IV data on political regime characteristics. There-
fore, empirical estimation utilizes the polity2 score as a proxy of electoral accountability.
Polity2 score is a combination of two indicators, Democ and Autoc. Democ is an indicator
of institutionalization of democracy and Autoc is an indicator of institutionalization of
autocracy. Both indicators range from 0 to 10. Both are an aggregation of indicators
capturing the concepts of competitiveness of participation, competitiveness and openness
of executive recruitment and constraints on the executive. The autocracy indicator also
captures an additional concept of regulation in participation.
Opposite ranges are used for assessing the same concepts when constructing the democ-
racy and autocracy indicators, giving a score of zero if the range is not applicable. For
example, the concept of constraints on the executive is assessed on a range starting from
whether there are substantial limits on the executive to executive parity or subordination.
For the autocracy indicator, the assessment of the same category ranges from whether
the executive has slight/moderate limitation to unlimited authority. Assessment of com-
petitiveness of political participation for the democracy indicator ranges from factional to
competitive while it ranges from suppressed to repressed in the autocracy indicator. Thus
the democracy and autocracy indicators capture two opposite ends of the political regime
spectrum3.
Polity2 is derived from subtracting Autoc from Democ and corrects for transitional peri-
ods. Thus polity2 ranges from -10 (indicating institutionalized autocracy) to 10 (indicating
3The reader is referred to the polity IV code book for a more detailed explanation (see Polity IV Project:
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institutionalized democracy). For the period under analysis, the polity2 score has a mini-
mum of -10 corresponding to the case of Swaziland and a maximum of 10 corresponding to
Mauritius. The overall mode of polity2 is -7. This is also shown in table 3.1. The trends
in different countries are presented in figure 3.2. The trends show a general improvement
in regime characteristics in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, there are several cases (e.g.
Gambia, Sudan and Zimbabwe) where the regime characteristics changed for worse during
the period under consideration. Botswana and Mauritius are the only countries which
consistently had democratic regimes during the period 1978 - 1998.
There are other variables that may be correlated with polity2 that also influence the
exchange rate. For example, political regimes characteristics may be correlated with aid
inflows which also affects the exchange rate premium. The regressions controls for this and
other variables to avoid the omitted variable bias and isolate the pure effect of political
regime characteristics. These controls include foreign direct investment flows (FDI) as a
percentage of GDP, openness as measured but the trade to GDP ratio, ODA aid flows
as a ratio of GDP and log of GDP per capita in 2005 constant PPP. These variables
are obtained from World Bank Development Indicators. Terms of trade for goods and
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3.4. Application to exchange rate overvaluation in Sub–Saharan Africa
services with 1995 as a base year are also controlled for. Data of the terms of trade is
obtained from Global Development Finance andWorld Bank Development Indicators. Two
dummies, transition88 and transition77, are included to capture instances of standardized
authority scores which are corrected for in the polity2 score. These dummies take a value
of 1 during periods of transition and “interregnum” or anarchy respectively, and a value of
zero elsewhere.
3.4.3 Results
From the theoretical framework, the expenditure on electoral manipulation by an incum-
bent depends on the quality of institutions. The incumbent decides to set high distortions
and then manipulates the election when institutions are weak. Polity2 is outcome based
hence the expenditure on electoral manipulation affects the measured polity2 score. Thus
polity2 could be endogenous. FDI inflows and GDP may also be endogenous. Therefore,
the estimation is based on the assumption that a subset of the explanatory variables is
endogenous (i.e. we have weit = {Polity2 FDI GDP/capita}).
Table 3.2 presents the results from the dynamic panel data estimation. The GMM results
correspond to the Arellano-Bond one estimator for reasons stated earlier. Bates (2008)
suggests that some African countries adopted anti-market policies because of their alliance
to the Soviet Union during the cold war. Column 2 presents estimation results that include
dummies for the cold war period and the debt crisis. These dummies turn out to be
insignificant. Column 3 results are for GMM with year dummies (the year dummies are
not presented in the table) while column 4 has a binary measure for political regimes
characteristics instead of polity2. The Anderson-Hsiao (AH) estimators are presented in
columns 5 and 6. Robust standard errors are reported in all cases.
Results from the GMM estimation show that democratization induces a reduction in the
parallel market rate exchange rate premium. Note that all variables including the depen-
dent variable and polity2, are differenced in the GMM estimation procedure. Therefore
coefficients measure changes in a change. The easiest way of interpreting the polity2 coef-
ficient is in the context of changes in a polity with a durability of two or more years (i.e.
∆polityt−1 = 0 so that ∆polityt −∆polityt−1 = ∆polityt). In this case, the coefficient of
polity2 can be interpreted as a percentage point change due to a unit change from a durable
polity. From the most conservative estimates in column 3, an improvement in the political
regime measure by 1 unit leads to a reduction in the parallel market to official exchange
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Table 3.2. Dynamic panel estimation results
Dependent variable: Lxrate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable dif-GMM dif-GMM dif-GMM dif-GMM AH1 AH2
lxratet−1 0.731*** 0.729*** 0.729*** 0.735*** 1.000*** 0.976***
(0.0485) (0.0486) (0.0494) (0.0485) (0.235) (0.216)
lxratet−2 -0.124** -0.124** -0.110* -0.160***
(0.0596) (0.0595) (0.0609) (0.0608)
lxratet−3 -0.133*** -0.145*** -0.148*** -0.119**
(0.0441) (0.0444) (0.0450) (0.0464)
Terms of trade 0.00210*** 0.00193*** 0.00203*** 0.00135** 0.00521 0.00623**
(0.000568) (0.000573) (0.000583) (0.000562) (0.00333) (0.00316)
ODA aid -0.554*** -0.517*** -0.548*** -0.456** -0.114 -0.402
(0.194) (0.197) (0.211) (0.193) (0.923) (0.891)
Openness -0.000450 -0.000206 0.000326 -0.000789 -0.00918 -0.0122*
(0.00191) (0.00188) (0.00185) (0.00169) (0.00746) (0.00714)
Transition88 0.119 0.140 0.126 0.176* -0.412 -0.228
(0.0977) (0.0984) (0.0998) (0.0995) (0.388) (0.383)
Transition77 -0.00562 0.0253 0.0421 0.0873 -0.542 0.311
(0.0952) (0.0957) (0.0959) (0.103) (0.446) (0.471)
Polity2 -0.0133*** -0.0119*** -0.0112*** 0.00137
(0.00405) (0.00418) (0.00423) (0.0254)
GDP per capita -0.118 -0.0733 -0.112 -0.151 -0.0590 -0.664
(0.132) (0.126) (0.126) (0.109) (0.967) (0.912)
FDI 0.0116** 0.0118*** 0.0128*** 0.0120*** 0.0522*** 0.0480***









Observations 344 344 344 336 365 358
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.4724 0.4786 0.5466 .0.3862 - -
Sargan test (p-value) 0.0020 0.0014 0.0014 0.0040 - -
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to a complete democracy in the next year will reduce exchange rate over valuation by at
least 22.4 percentage points. Using estimates from columns 1, this change will be 26.6
percentage points.
In column 4, political regime characteristics are measured by a dummy (democracy) taking
a value of 1 when polity2 is above the sample median (of -5). African states tended to
be socialistic when they obtained their independence. A key feature was one party states.
Thus they were more likely to be autocratic based on the polity2 scores. The categorization
for the democracy dummy is based on the median polity2 score instead of 0, as the cut-off
point. The significance of democracy confirms that more democratic countries are less
likely to overvalue the exchange rate. However, dem*xrate, the interaction term between
the exchange rate and democracy dummy is insignificant.
Availability of ODA aid reduces exchange rate over valuation, this simply indicates that
high levels of AID assistance provides foreign currency reserves. This sustains foreign
currency controls in a manner that inhibits the parallel market. Surprisingly better TOT
and higher FDI inflows increase exchange rate over valuation. These effects are significant
in all four GMM estimates.
The validity of using lagged variables as instruments hinges on the absence of second or
higher order autocorrelation in the first differenced errors. The Arellano-Bond tests for
absence of autocorrelation in first-differenced errors fail to reject the null hypothesis of no
2nd or higher order autocorrelation. However, the Sargan test for over identification reject
the validity of the restrictions in all cases. As highlighted earlier, the one-step Sargan
tests is unreliable. The acceptance of the null of no second or higher order autocorrelation
confirms the validity of lagged variable as instruments implying that GMM estimates in
Table 3.2 are consitent. These estimates provide evidence that institutionalized democra-
cies reduce exchange rate over valuation. This confirms the argument that weak electoral
institutions permit the incumbent to maximize on the appropriation of rents. The same
conclusion is reached from static fixed effects estimation results shown in table A.1 in
appendix A.
The Anderson-Hsiao estimates presented in column 5 show total persistence in the ex-
change rate premium. All other variables, except the FDI are insignificant. When political
regimes are proxied by a dummy, a significant impact on the exchange adjustment is found.
This is shown by the significance of the interaction term in column 6. The coefficient of
dem*xrate implies a downward adjustment of 25.1% of the exchange rate premium from
its previous level in more democratic societies compared to autocratic countries. This












3. Electoral accountability and incentives for market distortions
misalignments when compared to those in autocratic countries. This is the expectation
when there is electoral accountability.
Evidence from the likelihood of having an aligned exchange rate further confirms the hy-
pothesis that exchange rate distortions were higher in countries with very weak democratic
institutions. If exchange rate overvaluation is purley attributable to benevolent reasons,
then its negative impact and the resultant pressure should induce an exchange rate align-
ment irrespective of the quality of institutions. If this were the case, political regime
characteristics will not have a significant effect on the probability of having an aligned
exchange rate. This is tested using a fixed effects logit model. The dependent variable is
Noexcess, based on a cut-off parallel to official rate ratio of 2 (i.e. a black market premium
of 100%). Noexcess takes the value of 1 if the ratio is less than 2 and zero otherwise hence
the probability of having an aligned exchange rate is estimated. This estimation excludes
countries like Gambia which never overvalued excessively and countries like DRC which
overvalued excessively all the time. The final estimation was carried out with 13 countries
and 277 observations.
The fixed effects logit results are presented in table 3.3 column 1. Polity2 has a positive and
significant coefficient. This confirms the hypothesis that more democratic regimes are more
likely to have an aligned exchange rate. Alternatively expressed, less democratic regimes
are more likely to have an overvalued exchange rate. Large exchange rate distortions create
rents which benefits the incumbent even if the overvaluation is initially well-intentioned.
Such corruption and the welfare losses it brings, will generate political pressure which is
costly for incumbents in democratic societies who lack alternative means of mitigating the
pressure. Incumbents in undemocratic countries are insulated from this pressure. They
opt for suppression and keep both rents and power, while politicians in democratic societies
will have to maintain minimal distortions if they are to maintain political power.
The choice of a 100% premium (i.e. cut-off point of 2) might seem arbitrary. Therefore, a
fixed logit model was also estimated at a different cut-off point of 1.5 (i.e. 50% premium)4.
As shown in column 2, the conclusion remains the same. More democratic societies are
more likely to have an aligned exchange rate than autocratic regimes.
The results also show that recipients of higher AID and FDI inflows as well as those facing
improvements in terms of trade are less likely to reduce the magnitude of distortions while
countries with higher income per capita are more likely to adjust. The later could be
4Using a higher cut-off point severely reduces the number of observations since more countries will have
Noexcess = 1 all the time. Also, there will be more consecutive observations taking a value of one. These













Table 3.3. Conditional logit results for the probability of having an aligned exchange rate
(1) (2)





GDP per capita 5.446*** 3.973***
(1.634) (1.412)











Number of countries 13 16
LR χ2(8) 47.64*** 53.18***
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
attributed to the fact that suppression is more costly in higher income societies as argued
above.
3.5 Discussion
Evidence from GMM and fixed effects logit estimation confirmed the hypothesis that
less democratic countries have higher exchange rate distortions. These findings provide
evidence for this thesis’ alternative theory on the existence of high market distortions.
Distortions that prevail in an economy are an outcome of the interaction between self en-
riching office bearer’s rent seeking motives and the quality of institutions that determine
electoral accountability. Office bearers have an incentive to raise market distortions and
maximize rents that accrue to them, despite negative welfare effects caused by higher dis-
tortions. In democratic societies, citizens can fully express their preferences over policies
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ling moral hazard by politicians while in office. This constraints the ability of the office
bearer to raise distortions. The absence of electoral accountability in countries with weak
institutions permits incumbents to maximize on rent seeking. There is no incentive for
a self interested dictator to please the electorate because there are other effective means
for mitigating electoral pressure. As a result distortions will be higher and last longer in
undemocratic countries.
The case of Zimbabwe supports this argument. The government adopted an increasingly
interventionist policy since 2000. These policies led to hyper-inflation, a sharp economic
contraction (IMF 2005) and high unemployment. Yet they persisted. The distortions gen-
erated exclusive rents which accrued to party stalwarts and others in positions of influence.
A key group that benefited includes high ranking officers in the military, intelligence and
police services and traditional chiefs. This group and high ranking ruling party officials
were recipients of free farm implements (Gwaze 2003), subsidized fuel and concessionary
agriculture loans (Financial Gazette, 23-29 October 2003, ANDNetwork Journalist 2006),
foreign currency at the official rate (Chikukwa 2004), prime land under the land reform
programmes (Selby 2006) and many other benefits from distortions. Traditional chiefs
began to receive salaries and cars in 2002. The benefits that accrued to people in certain
position manifests the sharing of rents by the incumbent.
Events prior to the presidential elections in 2002 and 2008 showed that recipients of rents
acted to mitigate political pressure. Security and uniformed personnel became an integral
part of a “rule by fear and violence strategy” (Bracking 2005). The Political Order and
Security Act which outlawed gatherings of 12 or more people without police approval came
into effect in January 2002. Opposition parties failed to get this approval most of the time
(Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2002). The 2002 election was marred by violence
against opposition supporters but perpetrators were not arrested. The incumbent won the
election which was widely deemed not free and fair by independent observers. However, the
Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) which is hand picked by the incumbent approved
the election. The election result was contested in court. The 6 year presidential term
expired before the courts reached a decision. When the position of the incumbent came
under electoral threat after the 2008 presidential first round election, the military and
“militia” stepped in the election run off (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2008).
The opposition candidate pulled out citing violence and intimidation.
The weakness of electoral institutions in Zimbabwe is evidenced by the failure of courts to
settle electoral disputes as well as an electoral commission handpicked by the incumbent













ing pressure while the incumbent extracted rents from high distortions. These rents were
shared with people integral in circumventing the electoral process. This allowed higher
distortions to persist since 2000. For example, the black market premium had reached 24
000% in January 2008 (BBC 2008). If a person obtained foreign currency at the official
rate, he could import a luxury vehicle at a local currency equivalent that was barely enough
to buy 5 liters of cooking oil. Only high placed individuals had access to foreign currency
at the official rate. Thus distortions generated rents that accrued to the incumbent and
those he shared rents with. The persistence of such distortions was encouraged by the lack
of electoral accountability due to weak democratic institutions.
3.6 Conclusion
The chapter argued and presented evidence on the interaction between office bearers’
incentives and the quality of electoral institutions. When institutions are weak, self en-
riching office bearers maximize the appropriation of rents by maintaining higher distor-
tions. Through electoral manipulation, they mitigate political pressure caused by welfare
losses from high distortions. This allows them to continue the extraction of rents despite
huge welfare losses such rents may bring. Therefore, the existence of high distortions is at-
tributable to weak electoral institutions which erode electoral accountability. This permits
the office bearers’ financial motives for maximization of appropriation of rents to prevail.
Empirical evidence from exchange rate overvaluation in Sub–Saharan Africa supports this
argument. Less democratic less likely to maintain aligned exchange rates, they distort
more instead.
Events in Zimbabwe since 2000 support this explanation. High distortions have existed
since 2000. These distortions persisted despite their apparent failure to protect the poor
and their perverse effects on the economy as a whole. The weakness of democratic institu-
tions and the perceived manipulation of elections in Zimbabwe over the same period can
not be overemphasized. Thus, distortions in Zimbabwe are a good example of distortions
sustained to financially benefit the incumbent in a weak institutional environment. This
makes Zimbabwe a useful case study for investigating the impact of rent generating dis-
tortions that persist over long periods due weak institutions. The next chapter uses the























The social evils of market distortions: An
application to health outcomes in Zim-
babwe
4.1 Introduction
Like most developing countries, Zimbabwe adopted structural adjustment programmes
starting in 1991. Under these programmes, the domestic market was deregulated and
market forces given a greater role. However, after the year 2000, there was a major policy
shift towards greater market intervention. The resulting distortions led to asymmetric
access to commodities and generated exclusive rents. In addition, distortions hastened an
economic contraction that disproportionately affected ordinary citizens while rent seekers
were cushioned. These factors shifted the distribution of resources, concentrating access to
commodities among the wealthy few and leaving the poor with minimal resources (Reserve
Bank of Zimbabwe 2006). This had far reaching consequences for outcomes that are
intrinsically important to human life. However, little empirical analysis has focused on
the consequences of the policy changes on social outcomes like health. For this reason,
this chapter seeks to investigate the effects of the resulting market distortions on health
inequality among children in Zimbabwe.
The focus on health outcomes is motivated by three major reasons. Firstly, health is a












4. The social evils of market distortions: An application to health outcomes in Zimbabwe
Unlike income or expenditure, it adequately captures the notion of poverty as deprivation
of capabilities or failure of certain functionings (Sen 1987). Secondly, health achievements
largely influence people’s ability to exercise most other freedoms and capabilities. Last but
not least, health inequality is materially relevant in itself if it is caused by poor economic
policy (Sen 2002), as with the case of market distortions.
The policy shift in Zimbabwe offers a good example of policies that are sustained to
enrich policy makers despite their negative consequences. The effects of such policies on
well-being are yet to be fully explored. I argue that policy changes generated rents that
benefited only a few by design. This shifted command over resources and placed them in
the hands of a few people in positions of influence. The majority were left with minimal
resources. This reduced access to food and consequently worsened health outcomes on
average (Moursi et al. 2008, Steyn et al. 2006). The poorest were the most affected since
a majority of beneficiaries from rents are the elite. Thus policy changes increased wealth
and consumption inequality. This ultimately increases health inequality. This argument
is consistent with a neo-materialism interpretation of health differences which attributes
differences in individual health outcomes to differences in individual resources, among
them food availability (Lynch et al. 2000).
Using the 1999 and 2005/06 DHS data, the chapter asseses the above argument. The
data respectively covers the period before and after the policy shift. Only children aged
5 years or less are included in this analysis. Thus only children born after the policy
change are included in the 2005/06 sample. This facilitates a distinct comparison of child
outcomes before and after the policy shift. The objective of the chapter is to empirically
establish that market distortions reduced food consumption on average and increased
its inequality. Reduced food consumption worsened health outcomes and the increase
in food consumption inequality had a significant negative impact on health inequality
among children. Food consumption is measured by a food variety score. Child health
outcomes considered are stunting and underweight. The inequalities in food consumption
and health are estimated using the Kakwani et al. (1997) concentration index based on
rankings on an asset index derived from principal component analysis. The change in
wealth inequality is estimated from the asset index using a measure of relative inequality
proposed by McKenzie (2005).
Empirical results show that outcomes worsened after the policy shift. The average number
of food items consumed by children declined by 34%. The decline occurred across all wealth
quartiles. It was greater for children living in households in the poorest and middle wealth













weight for age declined significantly. Mean height for age declined by 19%. Its decline
was greatest in the middle quartiles. Mean weight for age declined by 16%. Its decline
was highest among the poorest and second poorest asset quartiles. The coefficient of the
food variety score is positive and significant for both height and weight for age in 1999
and 2005/06. Its magnitude implies the decline in mean food consumption reduced means
of height and weight for age by 37% and 59% of their overall changes. The decline in
food consumption under the new policies significantly worsened health outcomes among
children in Zimbabwe.
The McKenzie measure of inequality indicates that wealth inequality in 2005/06 was 16%
higher than in 1999. Estimates of the Kakwani et al. (1997) concentration index for food
consumption show increasing consumption inequality. This is evidenced by a 48% increase
in the concentration index. A decomposition that quantifies the impact of increased in-
equality in food consumption on the change in health inequality shows that it contributed
to an increase in stunting and underweight inequality by 11.3% and 6.5% respectively.
Since the change in consumption inequality is attributed to market distortions, this im-
plies distortions adversely affected the distribution of health among children.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 provides an overview of policy
changes towards greater government intervention in Zimbabwe since the year 2000. Section
4.3 introduces the data, discusses measurement issues and presents findings on changes in
the means and inequalities in wealth, food consumption and health outcomes. Section 4.4
analyzes the determinants of child health outcomes and decomposes the sources of changes
in health inequality to isolate the impact of a change in food consumption inequality.
Section 4.5 explains why the outcomes are attributable to the effects of market distortions
that prevailed post 1999. An overall discussion of findings is made in section 4.6 and
section 4.7 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Policy changes and market distortions in Zimbabwe
since 2000
Since 2000, there has been a major policy shift in Zimbabwe. This started with the
chaotic implementation of the land reform program which triggered an economic collapse
(Richardson 2007). Inflation rose sharply as the economy contracted. For example, month
on month inflation in September 2001 was 15.9% compared to 3.9% in September 1999.












4. The social evils of market distortions: An application to health outcomes in Zimbabwe
No.334 of 2001 as a response to the sharp increase in inflation. Prices of basic commodities
in October 2001 were pegged at their August levels through this Statutory Instrument.
The list of controlled commodities was enlarged in November 2002 to include at least 70%
of the items included in the consumer price index basket (IMF 2003). This was a big shift
from the 1990s when the domestic market was largely deregulated.
Controls were not limited to consumer products, but extended to other key markets like
the foreign currency market, interest rates and fuel. In fact, the whole economy became in-
creasingly controlled in comparison to the pre 1999 period. This is shown in figures 4.1 and
4.2. Shown in figure 4.1 are trends of the Heritage Foundation index of economic freedom
and the monetary freedom index, one of its sub-components. The Heritage Foundation
indices range from 0, indicating total government intervention, to 100, representing com-
plete economic freedom. The trends for Zimbabwe show a continued decline in economic
freedom for both the overall index and its subcomponents starting in 2000. The monetary
freedom index, which takes price controls into account, reached the lowest possible value
in 2005 following an even steeper decline after 2003.
Figure 4.1. Trends in indices of economic freedom and monetary freedom for Zimbabwe:
1995 to 2007
 













































































Figure 4.2. Trends in the Fraser Institute rankings on price controls and black market




































































Black-market exchange rates Price controls
Consistent with trends of the Heritage Foundation indices, the Fraser Institute ranking on
price controls, shown in figure 4.2, started to decline from 2000 and reached a ranking of 0
in 2004. The rankings range from 0 to 10 with a rank of 10 indicating a complete absence of
the distortion. The rankings for price controls indicate an increasingly controlled economy
beginning with a 50% drop in 2001 and reaching the lowest possible ranking of 0 in 2005.
The ranking for black market exchange rates was 0 in 2000 compared to a ranking of 7
in 1997. Foreign currency distortions were indeed severe. Between 2000 and 2005, the
ratio of the parallel to official exchange rate ratio reached its peak in the last quarter of
2003 when the parallel market rate went 650% above the official exchange rate (IMF 2005).
This divergence of the parallel market rate halted briefly at the introduction of the auction
system in 2004. It later continued until the dollarization of the economy in 2009. By that
time, the ratio of the parallel to the official rate had risen to above 10 million.
Other distortions were in the form of concessionary and negative real interest rates and
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ductive Sector Finance Facility (PSFF) which provided loans to the productive sector at
concessionary interest rates. In January 2004 for example, the concessionary rate was
30% per annum at a time when the average commercial lending rate was 500%, year
on year inflation 622.8% and interest on call accounts as high as 450% (Reserve Bank
of Zimbabwe 2004b). In 2003, a two tier fuel pricing system was established. Farmers,
passenger transport operators and government departments would pay subsidized prices
while the rest of the economy faced market prices charged by private oil companies.
This was in contrast to the policy regimes in the 1990s under the implementation of struc-
tural adjustment programs, ESAP and ZIMPREST. These policies sought to liberalize the
economy to give market forces a greater role. Under ESAP, most price controls on basic
commodities had been removed. This is evidenced by the upgrade in the Fraser rankings
for price controls from 2 in 1990 to 4 between 1995 and 2000. Government liberalized the
financial sector, unified the two-tier exchange rate system and removed credit and interest
rate controls. Although the exchange rate was fixed, it was pegged at market levels hence
the black market became non existent. The Fraser ranking for black market exchange
rates reached a peak of 9.8 in 1995 but dropped to 0 in 2000. Therefore, the reintroduc-
tion of price controls on basic commodities, exchange rate over-valuation post 2000 and
concessionary loans among other things, manifested a distinct policy shift towards greater
market intervention.
These new interventionist policies have implications for both the levels and distribution
of social outcomes. Changes in food consumption, health outcomes and wealth inequal-
ity after the policy changes since 2000, are empirically assessed in the next two sections.
Section 4.3 introduces the data and focuses on measurement of changes in wealth inequal-
ity, food consumption and health outcomes. Section 4.4 investigates the contribution of
changes in food consumption on changes in health outcomes. An explanation of how mar-
ket distortions contributed to the observed changes in outcomes is then provided in section
4.5.
4.3 Measuring changes in wealth, food consumption and
health outcomes after the policy shift
This section seeks to establish that wealth inequality increased and food consumption
declined especially among the poor, resulting in increased food consumption inequality
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policy shift
a point of reference, changes in wealth, food consumption and child health outcomes
from their 1999 levels are analyzed. Assuming similar population characteristics before
and after 2000, one would expect similar health outcomes before and after 1999 if the
policy environment had not changed. Therefore, if the 1999 and post 2000 samples are
comparable in all aspects other than policy regimes, then differences in health outcomes
are attributable to the policy change.
4.3.1 Data and measurement of variables
DHS data for the 1999 and 2005/06 surveys are used for the analysis. From each survey,
only children aged 5 years and under are selected. This gives two samples, each comprising
only children aged 5 years or under. One is selected from the 2005/06 DHS and consists
of only children born after 1999. The other is obtained from the 1999 DHS and comprises
similarly aged children born before or during 1999. This facilitates a distinct comparison
of health outcomes for the two periods. Measures from the 1999 DHS data reflect the
state of outcomes just before the policy change while measures from the 2005/06 DHS
data will reflect the state of outcomes after the policy changes. Limiting the analysis
of consumption and health outcomes to under 5 children removes overlaps and aids the
identification of the impact of the policy changes on these outcomes.
The number of selected children from the 1999 DHS and the 2005/06 DHS is 3892 and
5943 respectively. Urban observations constituted 23.4% and 25% of the 1999 and 2005/06
samples respectively. Both samples have an almost equal gender split (almost 50% females)
and similar age composition. The summary statistics are presented in table A.4 and shall
be further discussed in section 4.4.3 when the comparability of the two samples is closely
scrutinized.
Measures for child health status
The assessment of changes in health outcomes is based on height for age z-scores (HAZ) and
weight for age z-scores (WAZ). The HAZ and WAZ are computed from WHO growth stan-
dards. Anthropometric measures are widely used and preferred because of their objectivity
(see Wagstaff, van Doorslaer & Watanabe 2003, Pradhan, Sahn & Younger 2003, Sahn &
Younger 2005). They do not have self reporting errors while measurement errors are likely
to be random. Furthermore, the distribution of healthy children’s height is the same for
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tive to genetic variability and early childhood health shocks (i.e. factors experienced well
before the distortions in this case).
The z-scores capture the extent to which a child’s height/weight conditional on age and
gender, differs from that of a healthy reference population. A negative/positive z-score
implies that a child is below/above the median of the distribution of healthy children.
The mean HAZ and WAZ are respectively -1.17 and -0.61 in 1999 and -1.36 and -0.69 in
2005/06. These negative means imply that Zimbabwean children are below the reference
child growth standards. The means for 2005/06 are lower than in 1999. The differences
are statistically significant. This indicates a worsening of health outcomes on average in
2005/06. Using -2 standard deviations as the height/weight poverty line, the prevalence
of stunting increased from 32.6% in 1999 to 34.1% in 2005/06 and the prevalence of
underweight children increased from 12.1% to 13.9%. These statistics show worsening
health among children in Zimbabwe.
Food consumption index
The key variable of interest is food consumption, which is proxied by a food consumption
index. The index is constructed by summing up 11 food items consumed by the child
based on responses to questions on consumption of specific food items in the DHS. Among
selected food items are consumption of legumes, vegetables, meat, vitamin A fruits, other
fruits, grains, cereals and milk products (see subsection 4.A.2 in appendix 4.A for a detailed
explanation). The constructed food consumption index for 1999 has a mean of 3.41, mode
of 4 and lower and upper quartiles of 2 and 5 respectively. In 2005/06 the mean is 2.24,
mode is 1 and lower and upper quartiles are 1 and 3 respectively. These are lower than
the corresponding food consumption mean and quartiles for 1999. A weakness of using
this proxy is that DHS food consumption data is recall rather than concurrent data. This
could overstate changes in the index cross time if recall periods differ substantially, which
is not the case in this study. Nevertheless, the fact should be kept in mind when analyzing
the data.
Variations of similarly constructed measures (i.e. the dietary diversity index and food
variety index) have been widely used in the literature and found to be positively correlated
with greater nutrition intake of nutrients in developing countries (see Hatloy et al. 1998,
Hatloy et al. 2000, Onyango et al. 1998, Steyn et al. 2006, Moursi et al. 2008). Using DHS
data from 11 developing countries including Zimbabwe, Arimond & Ruel (2004) found a
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for socioeconomic status and concluded that the index has an effect on HAZ that is
independent of wealth. Their results show that changes in the index had the greatest
impact on mean HAZ among children in Zimbabwe. This confirms the validity of the
index for Zimbabwe and its use in this study.
Measuring wealth from asset ownership variables
Measuring income or wealth and its inequality requires income or expenditure information
which is not available from the DHS data. However, DHS contains information on asset
ownership. Following recent literature (Vyas & Kumaranayake 2006, McKenzie 2005,
Bollen, Glanville & Stecklov 2002, Filmer & Pritchett 2001), this information is used to
extract a proxy for wealth using principal component analysis (PCA). In this case, the
first principal component extracted from asset ownership variables is used to proxy for
household wealth. Filmer & Pritchett used data for Pakistan, Indonesia and Nepal, to
show that an asset index derived from PCA produces internally coherent results that are
consistent with those based on expenditure data. More support for use of the asset based
index is provided by Sahn & Stifel (2003). They find that an asset index derived from
PCA is a good predictor of stunting among children. A detailed explanation of the asset
index is provided in the first subsection of appendix 4.A.
4.3.2 Empirical estimation
Changes in wealth inequality
Wealth inequality is measured from the asset index. By construction, the asset index has
zero mean. Thus analysis of standard inequality measures such as the Theil Index and Gini
coefficient is not feasible. Instead, an alternative measure of relative inequality proposed
by McKenzie (2005) is used. The relative inequality of subgroup c in comparison to the
entire sample’s wealth distribution is denoted by Ic. Its computation is given by equation
(4.1), where σc is the standard deviation of subgroup c’s asset index and λ is the variance
of the asset index for the entire sample. McKenzie (2005) shows that Ic satisfies properties
of anonymity, scale independence, population independence and the Pigou-Dalton transfer
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Using this measure, the relative inequality in 1999 and 2005/6 are computed by first
pooling the two data sets to generate a pooled asset index. From the pooled index, the
standard deviation of the asset index in the 1999 sub sample (i.e. σ1999) and the standard
deviation on the asset index in the 2005/06 sub sample (i.e. σ2005/6), are obtained and used
to compute I1999 and I2005/6 respectively. If I2005/6 > I1999, then inequality is relatively
higher in 2005/6 than in 1999.
Changes in food consumption and health inequality
Inequality in health outcomes and food consumption by socioeconomic status is computed
using the Kakwani et al. (1997) concentration index. The asset index is used as the
welfare variable upon which socioeconomic ranking is based. For a population of size N,
the Kakwani concentration index is given by equation (4.2), where Rj is a child’s fractional
rank in the socioeconomic distribution, µ is the overall mean of the outcome of interest, fj
is the population share of children in socioeconomic group yj and µj is the mean outcome
for children in socioeconomic group yj. The test of significance of the concentration index
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.
When the outcome is good e.g. food consumption, a positive C implies inequality in favor
of higher socioeconomic groups. If the outcome is bad e.g. stunting and underweight, a
negative C implies inequality in favor of higher socioeconomic groups.
4.3.3 Results
The McKenzie index shows an increase in wealth inequality 5 years into the new policy
regime. The index for 1999 is 0.91 and that of 2005/06 is 1.06. This implies that wealth
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inequality in 2005/06 was 16% relatively higher than wealth inequality in 1999. There-
fore, the shift in policy towards greater government intervention in markets created an
environment suitable for widening wealth inequality. This widening difference in com-
mand of resources increases differences in access to food and health outcomes by various
socioeconomic groups.
Table 4.1 presents means of food consumption, HAZ and WAZ by asset quartiles. Food
consumption declined from an average of 3.41 items in 1999 to 2.24 items in 2005/06.
This translates to a 34.1% decline in items consumed. This decline cut across all asset
quartiles. However, the 23.6% decline in consumption for children in the richest quartile
is significantly below the average for the entire sample. The largest proportionate decline
was in the poorest quartile where the mean declined by 39.5% followed by the upper
middle class (3rd quartile) with a 37.7% decline. The largest absolute decline in food
consumption was for the 3rd quartile, followed by the 2nd quartile. The richest quartile
had the least decline in food consumption both in absolute and proportionate terms. In
both samples, children in richer asset quartiles consumed more food items than children in
poorer quartiles. As such, the impact of the decline in food consumption should be more
severe on the poorer children. These findings are consistent with the observed widening
gap in the command over resources between the poor and the rich in 2005/06. Asset
quartiles were held at their 1999 values for calculating means for 2005/06 sample. Similar
patterns are observed when the 2005/06 asset quartiles are used (see table A.2 in appendix
A).
Stunting and wasting increased. Mean HAZ and WAZ declined between 1999 and 2005/06
for all levels of wealth. Mean HAZ declined by 16.5% from -1.17 to -1.36 standard devi-
ations from the median of the reference healthy children. Mean WAZ declined by 13.1%
from -0.61 to -0.70. Generally, mean HAZ and WAZ remained higher for children in richer
Table 4.1. Means of food index, HAZ and WAZ by asset quartiles
Food Index HAZ WAZ
Asset Range 1999 2005 %∆ 1999 2005 %∆ 1999 2005 %∆
poorest 25 % 2.76 1.67 -39.49 -1.38 -1.49 -7.79 -0.83 -0.95 -14.46
26 - 50 % 3.15 2.04 -35.24 -1.18 -1.36 -15.25 -0.69 -0.81 -17.39
51 - 75 % 3.55 2.21 -37.75 -1.09 -1.41 -29.36 -0.55 -0.60 -9.09
richest 25% 4.23 3.23 -23.64 -0.97 -1.16 -19.59 -0.32 -0.36 -12.50
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quartiles. The only exception is mean HAZ in the 3rd asset quartile which was lower than
mean HAZ in the 2nd quartile in 2005/06. Mean HAZ in this quartile had the largest de-
cline both in absolute terms (decline by 0.32) and relative terms (decline of 29.3%). Mean
food consumption for this quartile had largest absolute decline too. The lowest decline
was in mean HAZ of the poorest quartiles. At -1.38 in 1999, the scope for a decline in
mean HAZ was relatively lower for the poorest quartiles when compared to the highest
quartiles.
The pattern of the decline in the mean HAZ suggests a greater worsening of health outcome
in the middle asset quartiles. For WAZ, the pattern shows a larger decline in the means
for the poorest and second poorest quartiles. Changes in the gaps between mean HAZ
and WAZ of adjacent asset quartiles are greatest in the middle of the asset distribution.
For example, the gap in mean HAZ of the richest 25% and the second richest 25% more
than doubled from 0.12 to 0.25 while the gap between the second richest 25% and the
second poorest 25% actually declined due to a bigger decline in the mean HAZ in the 2nd
poorest quartile. The gap between the poorest and second poorest 25% declined from 0.20
to 0.13. A similar pattern can be observed with WAZ. The decline in the gap between
means of HAZ and WAZ of poorer children and those in the middle class is due to a larger
worsening in outcomes in the middle class rather than improvements among the poor.
This is a negative rather than a positive development.
Table 4.2 presents concentration indices, their standard errors, changes in the concentra-
tion indices and means for HAZ, WAZ and food consumption between 1999 and 2005/06.
In addition, the table presents these statistics for other important determinants of child
health outcomes. The concentration indices are based on asset indices calculated sepa-
rately for each year but using common asset indicators across the years. Reassuringly, the
choice of the asset index did not seem to change the estimated concentration index (see
table A.3 in the appendix A). In any case, the Kakwani concentration index is insensitive
to changes in the distribution of the welfare variable. It captures only changes in dis-
tribution of the variable of interest across the different socioeconomic groups (O’Donnell
et al. 2007)[pp98]. This implies that we capture only the change in food consumption in-
equality for example, that is driven only by the change in access to food by socioeconomic
status.
For easy of interpretation, the concentration index is calculated for the negative of the z-
scores of height and weight for age. The reported negative concentration for these variables
indicate a more than proportionately higher incidence of stunting and underweight among












4.3. Measuring changes in wealth, food consumption and health outcomes after the
policy shift
an increase in inequality while stunting shows a decline in inequality although inequality
remains. The predicted extent of inequality, is greater for underweight.
Food consumption inequality increased. This is shown by an increase in the concentration
index from 0.095 in 1999 to 0.141 in 2005/06. Both indices are significantly different from
zero. The change in the concentration index (of 0.046) is 48% of the 1999 value implying
a substantial relative increase in food consumption inequality. Other notable increases in
inequality are in access to safe water (0.037), access to sanitation (0.043) and incidence of
diarrhea (-0.057). Since diarrhea is a bad outcome, the negative change shows an increase
in inequality. Poor households also became larger in size relative the richer households. All
is not gloom however. A notable improvement is observed in the level of household head
education, as evidenced by the reduction in inequality (change of -0.038 or 23% drop).
With the exception of diarrhea, changes by 100% or above are generally on variables
whose concentration indices are not statistically different from zero. Therefore, nothing
Table 4.2. Variable means and concentration indices
1999 2005
Variable Mean C index Std Errora Mean C index Std Errora ∆ C
Stuntingb 1.168 -0.072 0.016 1.361 -0.048 0.010 0.024
Underweightb 0.608 -0.181 0.021 0.695 -0.193 0.016 -0.012
Food consumption 3.406 0.095 0.006 2.244 0.141 0.007 0.046
Lives in rural area 0.766 -0.220 0.007 0.750 -0.233 0.005 -0.013
Has sanitation 0.633 0.232 0.275 0.601 0.275 0.006 0.043
Has safe water 0.765 0.104 0.005 0.701 0.141 0.005 0.037
No of children 1.747 -0.049 0.005 1.812 -0.050 0.003 -0.002
Household size 6.174 -0.030 0.004 6.155 -0.016 0.003 0.013
Female headed household 0.367 -0.087 0.012 0.348 -0.088 0.010 -0.001
Household head age 42.2 -0.038 0.003 42.34 -0.015 0.003 0.023
Household head educ 6.458 0.165 0.005 6.852 0.126 0.004 -0.038
Mothers’s education 4.431 -0.041 0.005 4.282 -0.043 0.003 -0.002
Age in months 29.613 -0.002 0.005 30.015 -0.002 0.004 0.000
Gender (female=1) 0.496 0.004 0.004 0.499 0.008 0.007 0.004
Was born small 0.160 -0.062 0.024 0.150 -0.068 0.020 -0.006
Breastfeeding duration 15.955 -0.014 0.005 15.310 -0.024 0.005 -0.010
Has diarrhea 0.140 -0.042 0.025 0.131 -0.099 0.021 -0.057
Has fever 0.256 -0.023 0.018 0.084 -0.054 0.027 -0.031
Coughs 0.399 -0.028 0.013 0.224 -0.094 0.015 -0.066
a - This is the standard error of the concentration index
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much should be read from the relative changes in the concentration indices for variables
like fever, coughs and gender of the child whose indices are not statistically different from
zero in both periods.
The observed increase in food consumption inequality is consistent with the hypothesis
that market distortions increased inequality in food consumption due to asymmetric access
to food, the creation of exclusive rents and an economic contraction that was dispropor-
tionately borne by the poor. This is vindicated by the relative increase in wealth inequality
in 2005/06. Higher levels of wealth inequality imply greater concentration of resources in
the hands of the richer households. This contributed to the 48% change in the concentra-
tion index of the food consumption index. Due to limited access, poor households’ range
of consumed food items declined. Such a reduction in food variety has negative conse-
quences for nutritional intake, translating into poorer health among the poor (see Moursi
et al. 2008, Steyn et al. 2006, Hatloy et al. 2000, Onyango et al. 1998).
HAZ for children in the middle classes worsened by big magnitudes which brought them
closer to HAZ for poorer children. This is responsible for the perceived decline in stunting
inequality. The same reasoning applies for the modest increase in WAZ inequality. In
relation to patterns in food consumption, two offsetting effects on health outcomes can be
observed post 2000. On one hand, the mean of food consumption declined significantly
in the middle quartiles of the wealth distribution. This brought them closer to those of
poorer households thus reducing health inequality. On the other hand, inequality in food
consumption increased. This effect increases inequality in health outcomes.
Due to the presence of confounding effects, the observed declines in HAZ and WAZ may
not be wholly attributable to the reduction in the consumption of food. A deterioration
in other determinants of health also reduce the mean HAZ and WAZ while improvements
have the opposite effect. Similarly, reduced inequality in other determinants of health
e.g education, mask the impact of increased inequality in food consumption on health
outcomes. Furthermore, the observed change in health inequality depends on whether the
effect of increased inequality in consumption is stronger than the effect of declining means.
Therefore, a multivariate analysis of the determinants of health outcomes is necessary for
measuring the impact of declining food consumption. A decomposition of the sources of
changes in health inequality sheds more light on the contribution of the decline in mean
food consumption and increased inequality in food consumption on health outcomes. The
next section investigates the impact of declining consumption and decomposes the sources












4.4. Empirical assessment of the impact of changes in food consumption
4.4 Empirical assessment of the impact of changes in
food consumption
The association of declining means in food consumption and declining means for HAZ
and WAZ is insufficient to establish a causal link between market distortions and health
outcomes through the impact distortions have on access to food. Further analysis is
made to identify the source of changes in health outcomes. Similarly, increases in food
consumption inequality may not be reflected in ultimate increases in health inequality due
to the presence of confounding effects and the offsetting effect of declining means. This
necessitates a decomposition of changes in health inequality.
4.4.1 Measuring the impact of food consumption on health out-
comes
The impact of a decline in food consumption on health outcomes can be analyzed using
the regression in equation 4.3. Hi is a measure of child i′s health outcome, FVS is the food
index and β0 is the impact of food consumption on the health outcome. Other determinants
of the health outcome are denoted by a k × 1 matrix X and εi is the disturbance term.
This regression is based on a standard specification that includes community, household
and child specific determinants of health (e.g. Lavy et al. 1996, Ponce et al. 1998, Case
et al. 2002).
Hi = α + β0FV Si +
∑
k
βkxki + εi (4.3)
The community effects include dummies for rural-urban classification, access to sanitation
and access to safe water. A household is considered to have access to sanitation if it has
either a flush toilet, blair toilet or pit latrine. It has access to safe water if it has access
to either treated pipe water, boreholes or protected wells. Household variables include
household size, the number of under 5 years old children and the household head’s age,
years of education and gender (female household head takes a value of 1). Child specific
variables include age in months, age squared, gender (girl child =1), mother’s years of
education and breast-feeding duration. Other child specific variables are illness dummies
like whether a child had diarrhea, fever or coughed during the previous two weeks and the
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The size of the child at birth is controlled for. This is captured by a dummy taking a
value of one if the baby was born smaller than average based on the mothers’s recall of
the child’s size at birth. A child whose size at birth is below average has a lower HAZ
and WAZ than a child whose size at birth is above average if the two grow at the same
rate. This necessitates controlling for size at birth in order to isolate the true impact of a
variation in food consumption on variations in HAZ and WAZ.
Selection issues
Some of the child specific variables are only captured for children whose mothers live in
the households. There is no information on consumption, breast-feeding and illness for
children who do not live with their mothers. As noted in Case et al. (2002) and Case,
Paxson & Ableidinger (2004), expenditures on healthy food items are lower for children
not living with their mothers. This may translate to higher prevalence of stunting and
underweight among these children.
Indeed, besides height for age in 2005/06, the distributions of HAZ and WAZ of children
living with their mothers have different means from those of children not living with their
mothers. As shown in figures B.1 and B.2 presented in appendix B, children living with
their mothers are generally better-off. Tests for equality of means between children with
present and absent mothers are rejected for all but height for age in 2005/06. This indicates
that on average, children living with their mothers are better off.
To avoid potential selection bias, the regression in equation (4.4) is estimated using the
Heckman selection procedure based on mother presence in a household. A father presence
dummy is constructed and used as the excluded variable. This dummy takes a value of
one if a father is dead or existence is not known and a value of zero otherwise. The use of
father presence assumes that a father’s non-existence influences the likelihood of staying
with a relative in two ways. Either both parents of the child are dead or that single
mothers without support of the child’s father are forced to leave the household and find
work. Furthermore, a father’ presence is presumed to affect child nutrition only through
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Results
Results from the regression of HAZ and WAZ on their determinants are shown in table
A.6 in appendix A. In all regressions, the father alive dummy is a significant predictor of
a mother’s presence in the household. Mothers of children whose fathers are alive or their
existence known are more likely to be members of their children’s households. The father
alive dummy was included in OLS regressions of HAZ and WAZ for only children whose
mothers are present in their households. Its coefficient lost significance in all regressions
once food consumption is controlled for. This confirms the validity of excluding the dummy
in the final regressions.
Table 4.3 presents the impact of food consumption on HAZ and WAZ. The coefficient
of the food consumption index was positive and significant in all regressions. For HAZ,
the coefficient is around 0.06 in both years. This implies that greater food variety in
consumption improves mean HAZ. A reduction in mean food consumption from the 1999
to the 2005 level reduced mean HAZ by 0.07. This is 37% of the overall decline in mean
HAZ. The coefficient of the food index in the WAZ regression is 0.046 in 1999 and 0.0613.
Mean WAZ in 2005 would have been higher by 0.05. This is 59% of the decline in the
mean of WAZ. Thus the decline in food consumption significantly contributed to worsening
health outcomes among children in Zimbabwe.
Children suffering from diarrhea have lower HAZ and WAZ on average. The coefficient of
diarrhea is negative and significant for WAZ in 2005/06 and HAZ in both years. Diarrhea
has an immediate effect on WAZ since it captures short term health shocks hence its
significant impact is expected. The significant impact of diarrhea on HAZ for both years
Table 4.3. The impact of selected variables on HAZ and WAZ
HAZ WAZ
Variable 1999 2005 1999 2005
Food index 0.0611*** 0.0605*** 0.0457*** 0.0613***
(0.0226) (0.0228) (0.0154) (0.0173)
Was born small -0.428*** -0.350*** -0.464*** -0.514***
(0.0988) (0.0864) (0.0667) (0.0652)
Has diarrhea -0.277** -0.219** -0.119 -0.252***
(0.109) (0.0927) (0.0727) (0.0696)
Household head’s education 0.0290** 0.00386 0.0291*** 0.0295***
(0.0125) (0.0120) (0.00834) (0.00903)
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indicates that diarrhea is also capturing long term or recurring illness e.g. illness due to
HIV/AIDS. Household head’s years of education has a significant positive impact on HAZ
and WAZ in all regression expect for HAZ in 2005/06. This implies that higher levels
of households head’s levels of education in 2005/06 improved health outcomes. People in
their teens in the 1980s and 1990s benefited from increased investments in education in
that period. These cohorts were household heads by 2005 hence the increase in average
education. The positive impact of higher levels of education of household heads was more
than offset by the decline in mean food consumption.
The measured impact of food consumption is obtained after controlling for the stature
of the child at birth. Babies who were born small have lower HAZ and WAZ hence the
significant negative coefficient of size at birth in all regressions. The coefficient of food
consumption thus captures the pure effect of a variation in the consumption on child growth
holding the child’s size at birth and other variables constant. The significance of the food
index coefficient confirms the declining food consumption contributed to worsening health
outcomes in Zimbabwe. Food consumption is the second largest impact on HAZ and WAZ
among variables that can be changed by policy after the child is born. It is one of the only
two policy variables that are significant in all regressions.
The data show that children living in the same household had an identical FVS most of
the time. This, together with the observation of children born to the same mothers in
the sample, implies the possibility of cluster effects. Table A.7 in appendix A presents
the Heckman regression results with clustered standard errors allowing for intra household
correlation. The coefficient of the food consumption index remains significant in all four
regressions. The conclusion that the decline in food consumption worsened stunting and
underweight remains unchanged.
The above regression was also estimated using ordinary least squares on those children
living with their mothers only, since these are the only children for which food consumption
and illness variables are observed. The coefficient of food consumption remain positive and
significant in all regressions for HAZ and WAZ. However, while the estimated coefficient
for food consumption are very close to the Heckman estimations in 1999 regressions, they
are larger in the 2005/06 sample in both HAZ and WAZ regressions. These regression
results are presented in table A.8 in appendix A. From the results, it is also concluded
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4.4.2 The decomposition of changes in health inequality
The significance of the food index indicates the importance of availability of food for health
outcomes among children in Zimbabwe. Differences in the consumption of food should lead
to differences in health outcomes. The observed increase in inequality in food consumption
translates to increased health inequality, holding other things constant. A decomposition
proposed by Wagstaff et al. (2003) is used to establish the impact of an increase in inequal-
ity in food consumption on the change in health inequality. This decomposition uses a
multivariate regression framework to isolate changes in health inequality into three major
components. These are: a) changes in the degree of inequality of determinants of health,
b) changes in the means of these determinants and c) changes in the impacts of these
determinants on health outcomes.
Let C be the Kakwani concentration index. Changes in C reflect the changes in health
inequality. The decomposition of changes in child health inequality is made from estimates
of a linear regression of Hi on a vector of its determinants as in regression 4.3. This
regression is rewritten in equation (4.4), where X now includes food consumption.
Hi = α +
∑
k
βkxki + εi (4.4)
Wagstaff et al. (2003) showed that given (4.4) the concentration index can be expressed as
in (4.5) where Ck is the concentration index for variable k, xk is its mean and µ is the mean
of Hi. In the second term of the right hand side, GCε is the generalized concentration





The decomposition of changes in the concentration index is derived from the total differ-
entiation of (4.5) to give (4.6). Allowing for both the direct impact of α, βk, xk and Ck
on C and their indirect impact through µ, the total differentiation of C is approximated
by (4.7) after some manipulations2.




























































































dCk + dGCε/µ (4.7)
The second component of (4.7) shows the impact of a change in coefficients and the
third component shows the impact of a change in the determinants’ means. The fourth
component shows the impact of changes in inequality of the determinants on the overall
change in health inequality. This fourth component is the one pivotal in establishing the
link between changes in inequality in food consumption and changes in health inequality.
Using the neo-materialism interpretation of health inequality, I argue that policy changes
post 2000 led to increased health inequality through the resulting asymmetry in access to
food across the wealth distribution. To substantiate the argument, the fourth component
of the decomposition in equation (4.7) should indicate a significant impact of the increase
in food inequality on the overall change in health inequality. Since the regression controls
for confounding effects, the outcome of this decomposition establishes the link between
the policy shift and increased health inequality via increased food consumption inequality.
Results
Results from the decomposition of the change in health inequality are presented in table
4.4. For both stunting and underweight, the increase in food consumption inequality had
a large adverse impact on health inequality. For stunting, the effect of increased food con-
sumption inequality on overall health inequality is 11% of the 1999 concentration index or
33% of the total change in stunting inequality. This implies that stunting inequality may
have improved by a greater magnitude if food inequality had not increased. For under-
weight, the change attributable to increased food consumption inequality is 6% of the 1999
concentration index. The decomposition thus reveals that changes in food consumption
inequality had a large negative impact on health inequality.
The adverse effects of the increase in food consumption inequality can be put into context
by noting that it wiped out the benefits of reduced inequality in the household heads’s
levels of education. The change in inequality in stunting and underweight attributable
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Table 4.4. Total differential decomposition of changes in stunting and underweight in-
equality
Stunting Underweight






Food consumption -0.0082 0.0102 0.0003 11.28 -0.0117 0.0242 -0.0242 6.49
Lives in rural area 0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0306 -1.08 -0.0016 0.0001 -0.0027 0.90
Has sanitation -0.0029 0.0010 0.0220 3.97 -0.0030 0.0014 -0.0356 1.65
Has safe water -0.0024 0.0009 0.0265 3.28 -0.0031 0.0020 0.0248 1.69
No of children -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0003 0.29 -0.0008 0.0025 0.0202 0.45
No of children
squared
0.0002 0.0000 0.0005 -0.25 -0.0020 -0.0012 0.0020 1.11
Household size -0.0007 0.0000 0.0014 0.93 0.0018 -0.0001 -0.0370 -1.01
Female headed
household
-0.0001 0.0001 0.0006 0.10 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0054 0.03
Household head
age
0.0161 0.0001 0.0095 -22.29 -0.0264 -0.0005 0.2197 14.57
Household head
age-sqrd
-0.0063 0.0000 0.0004 8.72 0.0307 0.0008 -0.0697 -16.94
Household head
educ
0.0061 -0.0023 0.0330 -8.47 0.0118 -0.0065 -0.0016 -6.53
Mother’s educa-
tion
0.0002 0.0001 0.0018 -0.30 0.0001 0.0003 0.0015 -0.08
Age in months 0.0006 0.0032 0.0277 -0.76 0.0004 0.0065 0.1886 -0.24
Age squared 0.0014 -0.0029 -0.0122 -1.96 0.0010 -0.0052 -0.1014 -0.53
Gender -0.0004 0.0000 0.0017 0.62 -0.0007 -0.0002 0.0088 0.37
Was born small -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0001 0.47 -0.0007 -0.0009 0.0016 0.40
Breastfeeding du-
ration
0.0003 0.0001 -0.0097 -0.44 -0.0024 -0.0017 -0.0493 1.32
Food*breastfeeding 0.0000 0.0000 0.0111 0.05 0.0007 -0.0002 0.0110 -0.37
Has diarrhea -0.0019 -0.0001 -0.0002 2.64 -0.0016 -0.0003 0.0043 0.87
Has fever 0.0004 0.0004 0.0006 -0.51 -0.0030 -0.0102 0.0005 1.67
Coughs -0.0007 -0.0002 0.0004 0.89 -0.001 -0.0016 -0.0054 0.87
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respectively. This means that increased food consumption inequality offset the positive
impact of a reduction in education inequality. For stunting, the contribution of the effect
of a change in the effectiveness of education was high and reinforced the effect of the
reduction in education inequality.
Increases in inequality in access to sanitation and safe water both contributed to increased
inequality in stunting and underweight. However, the magnitudes of their contribution are
smaller than the effects of food consumption and education. The contribution of changes in
inequality in illness variables, birth size, breast feeding duration, household size, household
head gender are negligible. A surprisingly large contribution is the impact of a reduction
in inequality of the household head age which reduced both stunting and underweight
inequality. The effect, which is as high as 22% of the 1999 concentration index, countered
worsening health inequality from the impact of most changes in inequality of the other
determinants of health status.
Changes in means generally had a negligible impact on stunting and underweight in-
equality. Food consumption is a notable exception. The reduction in the mean of food
consumption contributed to improvements in stunting inequality. The effect of a reduction
in the mean of food consumption contributed to decrease in the concentration index for
stunting by 0.01. This is equivalent to a 14% decline in the concentration index for stunt-
ing from its 1999 level of -0.07. This effect outweighed the impact of increased inequality
in food consumption. It confirms that the measured decline in stunting inequality is partly
a result of worsening consumption and HAZ in the middle of the distribution. The con-
tribution of a reduction in food consumption on WAZ is equally dominant. It reduces
the underweight concentration index by 0.024 (i.e. 13% of the underweight concentration
index in 1999).
Under the new interventionist policy environment, food consumption declined concurrently
with an increase in food consumption inequality. The increase in food consumption in-
creased health inequality. The reduction in the mean of food consumption worsened health
outcomes for everyone but weighed heavily on health outcomes for children in the middle
wealth groups. This worsened their health outcomes to bring them closer to outcomes for
the poor. This effect masked the impact of increased inequality in food consumption. In
terms of changes in health outcomes, the middle class were evidently the biggest losers
from changes in access to food after the policy shift. There are no runaway winners, but
the richer children were certainly not affected as much as poorer children were.
A common problem with decompositions is change in significance of variables over time.
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sions. Other child specific variables like gender, age and size at birth are also significant
in all regressions. If the coefficient is significant in the first period, i.e. 1999, its loss
of significance in the next period primarily affects the component of the decomposition
attributable to changes in the magnitude of the variable’s impact. Thus some caution is
needed in the interpretation of decompositions of some variables like diarrhea in the WAZ
regressions and household head’s level of education in the HAZ regressions for example.
4.4.3 Any other factors captured in the measured impact of food
consumption?
Although the decline in food consumption and increases in its inequality can be explained
as outcomes of the policy shift, it is necessary to establish that no other factors influenced
food consumption levels, its inequality and its measured impact. Possible explanations
include data changes, increases in HIV prevalence, demographic changes, natural disasters,
disease outbreaks and droughts. Each of these factors is considered below.
Data comparability
The DHS data have consistently been collected using the same sampling techniques over
the years. This makes two DHS samples easily comparable. Indeed, from the summary
statics presented in table A.4, the 1999 DHS and 2005/06 DHS are similar with respect
to the geographical, demographic and household composition. Rural observations consti-
tute 76.6% and 75% of the 1999 and 2005/06 DHS respectively. Equally comparable is
the samples’ gender composition, mother presence in households and household relation
structure. Females are almost 50% in both samples while the household’s head gender
split differs only by 2% (with 63% male household heads in 1999 against 65% in 2005/06).
In both samples about 15% of the children’s mothers are not members of the households.
The mean age of mothers in the two samples are almost equal at 27.9 years in 1999 and
27.7 years in 2005. From figure B.3, one cannot say that children were born to older
mothers in one sample than the other. The relation of children to the household head are
not significantly different either, with 64% and 63% of children in 1999 and 2005/06 being
sons/daughters of the household head respectively. Grand children in 1999 and 2005/06
respectively constitute 27% and 28% of the sample.
However, households in the 2005/06 sample had more people around the mode in 2005/06
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tween the two samples in strikingly similar. The increase in frequency in the middle might
be a reflection of coping mechanisms as people adjusted to income pressure and the clean
up campaign, “Operation Murambatsvina3”. This clean up campaign disproportionately
affected the poor. The majority of the victims returned to live with their extended fami-
lies thus increasing their household sizes. The number of children in a household is highly
associated with HAZ (Rona et al. 2003) and affects the spread of resources. Therefore,
the regression controls for the number of children in the household and the household
size. This weeds out potential effect of “Operation Murambatsvina”. The operation did
not change the mean incomes since the informal sector had resurfaced in a different form
by the time of the survey. Increased household sizes due to the operation also meant
pooling of income as households were integrated. Therefore the impact of “Operation
Murambatsvina” on mean food consumption is minimal.
Droughts and natural disasters
Among other possible explanations for the decline in mean food consumption and increase
in its inequality include natural disasters, disease outbreaks and droughts. There were no
major natural disasters and disease outbreaks that could have affected food consumption
and health outcomes in this period. The pattern of food production between 2000 and
2005 closely mirrors the pre 1999 period, despite the drought in 2002. Figure B.6 shows
trends in food and agriculture production indices as well as maize yield. The production
indices were computed using 1999 as the base year. These were obtained from the African
Development Bank (2007) while maize yields were obtained from FAO/WFP’s (2003) and
(2004) crop and food assessment reports. The indicies show that drought in 1996 was as
severe as the 2002 drought (see figure B.6 in appendix B). The biggest impact of the land
reform was more on non food production. This is evidenced by the continued downward
trend in the aggregate agriculture index which began to diverge from food production
trends. The FAO/WFP crop and food assessment reports also show a decline in non food
crops such as tobacco, while that of cereals seems to mirror pre 1999 trends.
Food production did not change although productivity declined after the Fast Track Land
Reform Programme. The decline in productivity was compensated by increased acreage
as newly resettled farmers shifted production away from cash crops to food crops. This
3This was implemented in May and June 2005. During this operation, shacks and unauthorized back
yard structures in urban and semi-urban areas were demolished. This left occupants of these structures
without immediate accommodation. Most resorted to living with their extended families. Since these
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maintained food production. Differences in access to food after 2000 can therefore be
explained by policy changes other than land reform post 1999. Among them are controls
on the price and marketing of grains. Any impact these have on reducing food consumption
is an outcome of the policy shift towards greater intervention since 2000. The reduction in
mean food consumption and the increase in its inequality in 2005/06 cannot be attributed
to droughts.
HIV and AIDS
The impact of food consumption inequality on health inequality is overstated if an increase
in HIV/AIDS is higher among the poor. Trends of HIV prevalence in the country actually
ease this concern. According to trends from estimates by the Ministry of Health and Child
Welfare in conjunction with WHO (see figures B.5 in appendix B), there was a decline in
HIV prevalence across all area classifications after the pandemic reached a peak in 1995.
These trends are supported by other estimates (see UNGASS 2006, UNGASS 2008). Even
the most pessimistic projections show a flattening of the trend after 1994 (Mugurungi
et al. 2008). These trends were compiled using the most recent technique in HIV prevalence
(EPP) hence statistical methodology can not be attributed to the decline. The report by
UNAIDS (2005), which sought a thorough investigation of whether the declines are real or
artificial, confirmed that HIV/AIDS declined even after taking migration and other factors
into account.
The prevalence of HIV/AIDS is different between rural, urban and other areas. It is lowest
in rural areas (Mugurungi et al. 2008) where the poorest live. A look at the DHS data
shows that the sample proportions by area type have not changed between the two DHS.
Hence they should be fairly comparable. Furthermore, there is no reason to assume that
any attrition from urban to rural areas was predominantly by infected persons. Going
by the most pessimistic trends showing a flattening out in the HIV prevalence trends, it
can be argued that HIV and AIDS has no influence on the measured impact of increased
food consumption. If alternatively the most optimistic projections are used, the measured
impact of food consumption inequality gives the lower bound of the true impact since
declines in HIV/AIDS should actually reduce the impact of food inequality.
I control for diarrhea, fever and coughing to obtain the pure impact of other determinants
of HAZ and WAZ after removing the effect of illness. This is important if children ex-
cluded from the regression are predominantly HIV orphans who are themselves ill hence
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have lower height for age and weight for age z-scores. The concentration indices in table
4.2 show a higher incidence of diarrhea among the poor, with this inequality higher in
2005/06. However, the impact of this increased inequality on changes in health inequality
is only modest while that of fever and coughing is negligible. The effect of food consump-
tion is reduced in the presence of disease. The impact of food consumption on HAZ did
not change between the two periods. This is inconsistent with large changes in unobserved
long term or recurring illness due to HIV/AIDS. Therefore, increased inequality in stunt-
ing and underweight attributable to increased inequality in food consumption cannot be
explained by changes in HIV/AIDS trends.
Demographic changes
Demographic characteristics for these two samples are similar to a large extent. Table A.5
in appendix A shows household population by age and sex, fertility rates, mean children
ever born and infant mortality rates. From the table, the age profile of the households
and fertility rates are similar across the two samples. In 2005 about 12% of household
members in urban areas are aged between 5-9 while the same cohort in 1999, constituted
13%. Other similarities are in household proportions of the 0 - 4 age group in both rural
(15% in 2005/06 against 14% in 1999) and urban areas (12% in 2005/06 against 13% in
1999). The 15 - 49 years old fertility rates in 2005 is 3.8 which is close to the 1999 rate of
4%. Equally similar are crude birth rates which at 31 births per 1000 population are equal.
The general fertility rate only differs by 3 live births per 1000 females (137 in 2005/06
sample against 141 in the 1999 sample). The mean number of children ever born, and
mean children leaving are within the same range.
There is a difference in the survival rates of underweight children at birth which increased
in the 2005/06 sample. If ignored, this may reflect in reduced mean in HAZ and WAZ in
2005/06. The regression controls for birth size by including a dummy taking a value of one
if the child was born smaller than the average. This eliminates the effect of birth size from
the impact of food consumption. As shown in table 4.3, this dummy is significant. The
increase in survival rates of underweight children at birth increases inequality is relatively
more underweight children are now surviving in poor households. The concentration in-
dices for 2005/06 and 1999 also show a proportionately higher incidence of small children
at birth among the poor. This increased in 2005. However, as shown in table 4.4, the













4.5. The impact of market distortions on wealth and food consumption
Migration
Migration reduces mean food consumption if it is disproportionately among the wealthier
leaving behind a poorer population with lower levels of consumption. This does not seem
to be the case from the data. The asset holdings of households in the upper distribution is
higher in the 2005/06 sample (see figure 4.4 in appendix 4.A). The average education level
in generally higher in 2005/06 across all quartiles. Furthermore, migrants send remittances
home. Thus the remaining population in not necessarily poorer. Reported trends on
migration only rose sharply in 2006 although there are no reliable official figures yet. This
period is not captured in the 2005/06 sample. Therefore the reduction in mean food
consumption can not be attributed to migration. The reduction in average consumption
of food and the increase in its inequality are attributable to widespread distortions that
prevailed after the policy shift. The next section explains the channels through which
distortions reduced food consumption and increased inequality.
4.5 The impact of market distortions on wealth and
food consumption
The relative increase in wealth inequality, the decline in food consumption and increases in
its inequality post 1999, are attributable to the existence of widespread market distortions
in that period. The impact of market distortions worked through three major channels
that increased inequality at the same time reducing average consumption. Firstly, there
was asymmetry in access to commodities due to shortages and exorbitant black market
prices. Secondly, market distortions created exclusive rents for the elite engaged in rent
seeking. Thirdly, distortions hastened an economic contraction which in its early period,
was predominantly borne by low income earners. The first channel reduced consumption
on average, the second increased inequality and the third effect disproportionately reduced
consumption for the poor. These channels are discussed below.
4.5.1 Asymmetric access to commodities
Price controls led to reduced consumption and increased inequality in access to controlled
commodities. This followed widespread shortages of commodities from retailers after price
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excess demand for the controlled commodities. Consequently a black market emerged
where prices were out of reach for the majority of citizens except for the wealthy and
those with privileged access (Bigsten & Durevall 2003). Raath, writing for The Times in
2003, made the following observation:
In the townships, maize-meal and other staples are stacked in grimy stalls
outside beer halls and at bus stops, but they come at ten times the legal price
and no one outside the elite can afford the black market
This observation illustrates that price controls worked against the poor instead of serving
them. Faced with shortages and high black market prices, most households responded by
cutting down on consumption. Those with enough resources resorted to importing basic
commodities both for own consumption and resale on the black market. This led to a large
increase in the number of day-shoppers arriving in neighboring countries when compared
to the 1999 figures (Hawkins 2003). Indeed, imports of food increased to almost triple
their pre-price controls after 20014. However, a lot of households failed to import food due
to lack of access to foreign currency and various institutional constraints. For example, it
took 6 months to obtain a passport in 2003 and speeding up the process usually required
a bribe (Chikukwa 2004). Middle income households suffered the same fate as poorer
households. Most could not afford the black market prices and were not able to cope
with domestic shortages by importing basic commodities. Meanwhile, those with access
to foreign currency at the official exchange rate, the more affluent and cross border traders,
were better placed to benefit or cope with price controls. This disproportionately reduced
food consumption of poorer households and increased consumption inequality.
4.5.2 Creation of exclusive rents
Market distortions generate rent seeking opportunities. However, only a privileged few can
capture these rents and profit from existing distortions. In Zimbabwe, it was the elite who
were better able to capture these rents because of their influence and stronger command
over resources. Therefore market distortions created exclusive rents for the elite. This
increased income for a small section of the population that was engaged in rent seeking
while the majority’s income dwindled. As a result, consumption for everyone else dropped
by large margins while that of rent seekers was maintained. This explains the less than
average reduction of food consumption by children in richer households.












4.5. The impact of market distortions on wealth and food consumption
A particular case of exclusive rents was in the fuel market. In response to fuel shortages
that began in 2001, the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM) selectively issued
companies and individuals with direct fuel import licences to import fuel strictly for com-
pany or personal use. Many licence holders abused the permits by selling the fuel on the
black market. A case in point was Comoil, a company owned by a sibling of a ruling party
MP. It sold petrol at ZWD 1 800 per liter yet the controlled price was ZWD 450 per liter
(Chikukwa 2004)[pg 192]. The two tier pricing system introduced later in 2003 further
created arbitrage opportunities. People with access to the cheaper fuel sold it on the black
market at more than four times the price charged by NOCZIM. These were transport
operators, high profile farmers and senior government officials (Financial Gazette, 23-29
October 2003, ANDNetwork Journalist 2006). Even the central bank governor later ac-
knowledged that the system benefited a privileged few and caused leakages to the parallel
market (Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 2006).
Others examples of sources of exclusive rents were concessionary financing and exchange
rate controls. Concessionary loans were a source of cheap money which mostly benefited
entrepreneurs. Most recipients invested the money in the money market or other non-
productive activities which generated quick returns. Exchange rate controls led to foreign
currency shortages and a vibrant black market. This benefited people with access to
cheap foreign currency at the official rate (mostly politicians, senior government officials,
bankers and their connections (Chikukwa 2004)) and wealthier individuals who traded
and speculated on the parallel market rate.
Meanwhile, most households, especially poorer households, failed to capture these exclu-
sive rents. They were ineligible for receiving concessionary loans, neither did they have
resources to participate in the buying and selling of foreign currency. This resulted in
contrasting fortunes. Those with access to the rents increased their asset holdings in
both the stock markets and real estate. This is vindicated by the improved performance
of the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) and the real estate sector during this period.
For example, the industrial index of the ZSE rose by 123% in 2002 (Reserve Bank of
Zimbabwe 2003) and houses sold by some real estate agencies doubled (Swarns 2002) yet
the economy had contracted by about 11.1% in that year. Thus exclusive rents widened
income differences and consumption declined on average since rents benefited only a mi-
nority of the population. During the budget speech in November 2002, the Minister of
Finance indeed acknowledged that real beneficiaries of price controls were black market
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4.5.3 Increased economic contraction
Besides their rent generating effects, market distortions contributed to an economic de-
cline that hit the poor hard. Market distortions and the lack of respect for property rights
under the land redistribution programme, are cited as the major causes of the economic
contraction in Zimbabwe (see Bigsten & Durevall 2003, IMF 2003, IMF 2005, Clemens &
Moss 2005). During the period 2000 to 2003, the economy had shrunk by 30% (Reserve
Bank of Zimbabwe 2004a) and unemployment increased. The volume of manufacturing
output for foodstuffs and stock feeds dropped by 9.9% and 25.5% in 2002 and 2003 re-
spectively while that of the manufacturing sector as a whole dropped by 14.5% and 11.8%
respectively (IMF 2004). This was largely blamed on price controls and foreign currency
shortages caused by exchange rate over-valuation and controls (IMF 2003, Confederation
of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI) 2003). The significant cuts in production by most companies
led to layoffs, mostly targeting ordinary employees and casual workers. Thus economic
contraction also disproportionately affected ordinary employees.
The above three factors, (i.e. asymmetric access to commodities, exclusive rents and
economic contraction) led to a shift in the distribution of resources. They concentrated
access to commodities among the wealthy and left the everyone else with minimal re-
sources. These privileged few were able to increase their wealth and maintain their levels
of consumption. On the other hand, poor and middle class individuals commanded fewer
resources. Their consumption consequently declined. These contrasting fortunes led to a
reduction in food consumption and the increase in inequalities in both wealth and food
consumption observed in this chapter.
4.6 Discussion
Empirical findings of the chapter have established that inequality in wealth and food
consumption increased after the policy changes post 1999. At the same time, food con-
sumption declined while stunting and underweight increased across all asset quartiles on
average. In addition, a significant adverse effect of an increase in inequality in food con-
sumption on health inequality has been identified. All these can be explained as outcomes
of the widespread distortions that originated from the policy changes. The schematic
diagram in figure 4.3 summarizes the link between market distortions and these outcomes.
The figure highlights that market distortions in Zimbabwe led to asymmetric access to













































sulting in food consumption inequality. In addition, market distortions created exclusive
rents. This allowed rent seekers, chiefly the elite, to increase their wealth and general
command over resources. They were able to maintain or even increase their consump-
tion while every one else reduced theirs. Furthermore, market distortions hastened an
economic contraction that disproportionately harmed the ordinary citizen. At the same
time, incomes of rent seekers were increasing thus cushioning them from the economic
decline. This allowed rent seekers to sustain their levels of consumption at a time when
ordinary households were reducing theirs. The eventual outcome is a reduction in both
the variety and level of food consumption households on average since rent seekers were
in the minority.
Average consumption of food by poorer households was reduced by a greater magnitude
compared to richer individuals since a majority of rent seekers and beneficiaries of dis-
tortions were the elite. This has been confirmed by findings in section 4.3. The findings
revealed a reduction in the consumption of food across all quartiles. The greatest reduc-
tion in both absolute and relative terms is among the poor. Consistent with the above
argument, children in richer households were the least affected. Market distortions re-
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households.
Food consumption is an important determinant of health among children. A reduction in
food consumption worsens health outcomes for children. Empirical evidence from devel-
oping countries confirms that both the level and variety of food consumed are important
for children’s health. The importance of food remains even after controlling for socioe-
conomic status and other confounding effects (see Arimond & Ruel 2004). Hence by
reducing access to food, market distortions consequently worsened health outcomes for
children. Findings in this chapter confirm this. The coefficient of food consumption was
positive and significant for both HAZ and WAZ. Its magnitude implies that the reduc-
tion in food consumption from its 1999 average reduced mean HAZ by 37% of the overall
decline in mean HAZ. It reduced mean WAZ by 59% of the decline in mean WAZ. The
policy shift towards greater intervention deepened poverty since it led to the decline in
food consumption and worsened health outcomes.
The increase in consumption inequality increased health inequality among children. This
is supported by empirical evidence from literature on child health inequality in other
countries, specifically developing countries. In Vietnam, 10% of the increase in height for
age inequality between 1993 and 1998 is accounted for by the increase in consumption
inequality (Wagstaff et al. 2003). Results from the decomposition in section 4.4 show that
an increase in food consumption inequality in Zimbabwe increased stunting inequality.
Moradi & Baten (2005) note that large height differences between the elite and the poor
have been observed in Nigeria, Ghana, Togo, Egypt, Haiti and some ethnic groups in
Ethiopia. These differences are largely attributed to poorer conditions among the poor.
This chapter confirms these findings. It finds that mean food consumption is higher for
richer children and that health outcomes for richer children are better than outcomes for
poorer children. Thus by concentrating access to resources and commodities among the
wealthy while leaving the poor with minimal resources, market distortions would increase
health differences between the poor and the rich.
These findings are consistent with the neo-material interpretation of health differences.
According to this interpretation, health differences result from differential accumulation
of exposures and experiences rooted in the material world (Lynch et al. 2000). The creation
of exclusive rents and the asymmetric effects of an economic contraction caused in part
by market distortions, influence individual private resources and the nature of public
infrastructure. These affect factors like education, availability of food and health services
which are important determinants of health status (see Pradhan et al. 2003). Similarly,













to food on average after the policy change. Difference in access to food led to differences
in health outcomes over the two periods and across socioeconomic groups.
The measured decline in food consumption, increase in its inequality, its impact and the
attribution to market distortions are doubtful in the presence of confounding factors.
Such factors include droughts, changing HIV/AIDS trends, demographic trends and sam-
ple comparability. Section 4.4.3 has highlighted that the 1999 and 2005/06 samples are
comparable. Demographic characteristics of the two samples are comparable except for
the higher survival of babies born smaller than average. This and the potential effect
of increased disease burden due to AIDS have been controlled for in the regressions. In
addition, HIV/AIDS prevalence has been declining. This should induce a reduction rather
than the observed increase in health inequality due to higher food consumption inequality.
Droughts should not be an issue since the food production trends prior to 2005 mirrored
the pre 1999 trends with two severe droughts on either side of 1999. Therefore, if any,
the influence of other factors on changes the mean of food consumption, its inequality and
measured impact should only be minimal. This implies that market distortions are the
underlying cause of reduced food consumption, increased inequality in food consumption
and consequently worsening health outcomes.
The above evidence implies that not only did distortions lead to economic contraction
in Zimbabwe, but led to worsening of health outcomes. Increased market intervention in
Zimbabwe actually reversed the gains from earlier investments in human capital. Indeed,
the results of this analysis have shown that a reduction in food consumption and an increase
in its inequality offset the improvement in health outcomes that resulted from previous
investments in education. The average household head among the poor in 2005/06 is
more educated. However this has not translated to reductions in the deprivation of basic
capabilities such a health because the negative effects of market distortions wiped the gains
away. This shows that market distortions have far reaching distributional consequences
that directly affect intrinsically important aspects of human life.
4.7 Conclusion
The economic policy regime in Zimbabwe has increasingly become interventionist. This
is in contrast to efforts towards minimal intervention under the structural adjustment
programmes implemented in the 1990s. The effects of this policy shift were analyzed using
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declined along with their mean HAZ and WAZ. The average number of items consumed
declined by 34%, mean HAZ by 19% and mean WAZ by 16%. The biggest declines were
on outcomes for children living in poor and middle class households. Children in richer
households were the least affected. The decline in food consumption contributed to 37%
and 57% decline in means of HAZ and WAZ respectively.
Wealth inequality in 2005/06 was 16% relatively higher than inequality in 1999. This con-
tributed to an increase in food consumption inequality. The increase in food consumption
inequality is evidenced by a change in the Kakwani concentration index for food consump-
tion by 48% of the 1999 value. Evidence from the decomposition of changes in health
inequality shows a considerable impact of the increase in food consumption inequality on
child health inequality. The increase in inequality in food consumption contributed to
increased nutrition inequality by a magnitude of 11% and 6% of stunting and underweight
concentration indices in 1999.
The changes in the level and inequality in food consumption are an outcome of widespread
distortions introduced post 1999. Policy changes post 1999 resulted in widespread market
distortions. Distortions created exclusive rents, led to asymmetry in access to food and
hastened an economic contraction that disproportionately affected the poor. These factors
changed the distribution of command of resources and concentrated them in the hands
of the wealthy few. This led to increased wealth and consumption inequality as well as
a reduction in food consumption. These negatively affected health outcomes. Therefore,
market distortions consequently had a large adverse effect on the level and distribution
of health outcomes for children in Zimbabwe. This conclusion is reached after taking into















4.A.1 Measuring wealth from asset ownership variables
Since DHS data has no income or expenditure information, wealth is proxied by an asset
index derived from PCA. Following the pioneering work of Filmer & Pritchett (2001), the
first principal component extracted from asset ownership variables is used to proxy for
household wealth. The first principal component is the linear combination that explains
the greatest variation in the asset indicators. Thus greater weight is given to assets with
higher variability. For n assets denoted by xj, each with a mean xj and standard deviation
sj, the first principal component for household i is given by (4.8) where a1j are weights
(called factor scores). For dummy variable asset indicators, a1j/sj gives the effect of having








The PCA based asset indices have been shown to be good predictors of household wealth.
Filmer & Pritchett (2001) show that the PCA based asset index produces internally coher-
ent results that are consistent with those based on expenditure data for Pakistan, Indonesia
and Nepal. McKenzie (2005) further shows that the asset index is reflective of income and
expenditure inequality in Mexico. Sahn & Stifel (2003) show that, like income, the asset
index is a good predictor of nutrition among children in several developing countries.
Two major issues have to be taken into consideration when constructing the asset index
using principal component analysis. These are clumping and truncation. Clumping means
that households are grouped in a small number of distinct clusters. Truncation implies
that households are spread over a narrow range of the asset index making it difficult to
distinguish some groups. These problems can be mitigated through careful selection of
asset indicators. This requires including: a) a wide range of asset ownership variables,
b) some continuous asset indicators and c) assets with wide variability in their ownership
(McKenzie 2005, Vyas & Kumaranayake 2006).
Asset indicators used in this study include durables like television, radio, refrigerator,
motorcycle/scooter, oxcart and car. These are combined with housing characteristics like
the type of the main floor material, the type of fuel used for cooking, ownership of bed
nests, whether the household shares toilet with other households and number of households












4. The social evils of market distortions: An application to health outcomes in Zimbabwe
computed with pooled data over the two surveys. This is necessary for computing the
McKenzie’s (2005) measure of inequality. The pooled index imposes equal weighting of
assets in the two periods. However, technology and economic development introduce new
assets and change the importance of some of the existing assets. Therefore, a year specific
asset indices is also computed but using common assets over the two samples. Unless
stated, this is the principal index used in the computations of the Kakwani concentration
indices of various variables and all the analysis in this chapter.
Table 4.5 presents the ownership of durable assets by the computed year specific asset
index quartiles. The presented figures show internal coherence of the asset index. It is
encouraging to note that none of the households in the poorest quartiles owned a car,
telephone or refrigerator in both years. Ownership of all durable assets except bicycle
increases with the asset quartile. The high proportion of bicycle ownership in the middle
quartile are not inconsistent either. More households in the middle are likely to own a
bicycle as a substitute for cars they can not afford while only a small percentage of the
poorest households can afford them. Among the poorest, none of them have cement, tiled
nor carpeted floors as expected. These housing characteristics show a higher proportion of
carpeted and tiled floors in the richest quartiles than lower quartiles. This further points
to the internal validity of the asset index.
The distribution in the asset index is shown in figure 4.4. The pooled asset index refers to
the asset index constructed for the data pooled over the two samples. The separate asset
Table 4.5. Housing characteristics and ownership of durable assets by asset index quar-
tiles (in percentages)
1999 2005/06
Variable Description Poorest Second Middle Richest Poorest Second Middle Richest
Car or truck 0.00 0.00 1.01 23.56 0.00 0.29 3.84 21.59
Telephone 0.00 0.00 0.32 22.04 0.00 0.00 1.13 32.15
Refrigerator 0.00 0.00 0.76 48.32 0.00 0.00 3.84 69.10
Bicycle 9.09 23.18 31.12 22.86 13.53 21.86 35.01 33.49
Motorcycle 0.00 0.00 0.44 2.28 0.00 0.34 1.4 2.90
Radio 11.93 24.22 71.55 90.75 0.00 24.35 77.02 92.99
Share toilet 49.75 46.26 61.43 53.33 31.98 39.28 44.26 31.51
Earth floor 100.00 25.54 2.73 0.13 100.00 26.10 4.66 1.33
Cement floor 0.00 74.46 96.63 78.39 0.00 73.90 94.30 86.09
Ceramic tiles 0.00 0.00 0.06 3.74 0.00 0.00 0.72 7.11

































































index refers to the asset index constructed separately for each year but using common
indicators over the two samples. Both indicators show a reduction in wealth in the lower
part of the distribution and an increase in the upper middle of the distribution. The
distribution of wealth is truncated around -2. This point corresponds to households who
do not own any assets and live in houses floored with cow dung, sand or clay. These are
the poorest people living in rural areas. Even the distribution of income is likely to have
a spike corresponding to the mode of income for this group.
4.A.2 Food consumption index
Food consumption is proxied by a food consumption index constructed by summing up
food items consumed by the child. These food items are captured from responses to 11
of the questions on food items asked in the DHS data. Among these are consumption of












4. The social evils of market distortions: An application to health outcomes in Zimbabwe
Thus in practise, the index is actually a food variety score. These types of measures are
widely used in the literature to capture dietary diversity and were found to be positively
correlated with greater intake of nutrients in developing countries (see Hatloy et al. 1998,
Hatloy et al. 2000, Onyango et al. 1998).
The literature on nutrition distinguishes between a dietary diversity score (DDS) and a
food variety score (FVS). Both scores are based on regrouping food items into 7 or 8
subgroups (see Arimond & Ruel 2004, Moursi et al. 2008, Steyn et al. 2006). The core
7 subgroups included are 1) starchy staples, 2) legumes, 3) dairy, 4) vitam A fruits and
vegetables 5) other fruits and vegetables, 6) fruits made from oil and butter and 7) meat,
poultry fish or eggs. The 8th subgroup is fats and oils. The DDS gives a score of 1 for
a subgroup if at least 1 of the food items in that subgroup has been consumed and 0
otherwise. The scores for all the subgroups are then summed up to give the DDS. On
the other hand, the FVS simply sums up all the food items consumed across the various
subgroups. I take the later approach and compute the food index based on the above
subgroups excluding fats and oils which are not captured in the Zimbabwe DHS.
Both the DDS and FVS are good predictors of nutritional intake. However, following
the results from Steyn et al. (2006), the FVS is preferred. In an analysis based on the
National Food Consumption Survey, 1999 for South Africa, Steyn et al. (2006) found a
positive correlation between mean nutrient adequacy ratio and both the food variety score
(FVS) and DDS for 1 - 8 year old children. However, the Pearson correlation coefficients
of mean nutrient adequacy ratio and FVS or DDS were higher for FVS for all subgroups
(i.e. 1-3 years, 4-6 years and 7-8 years). Similary, Pearson correlations between height and
weight for age z-scores and DDS or FVS were higher for FVS. This motivates the choice
of the FVS.
The food indices for the two samples is presented in figure 4.5. It shows a big reduction
in the food variety index in 2005/06 when compared to 1999. The mode of food index
for 1999 is 4 food items compared to 1 food item in 2005/06. The figure highlights that
despite the general shift to consumption of few food items in 2005/06, there are children
who still managed to consume a wider range of food items. This is consistent with the







































































5.1 Summary of findings
The thesis showed that market distortions generate rents which attract bribery that accrue
to office bearers. The outcome generated by this bribery is inefficient, even if such bribery is
competitive. This is in contrast to the “efficiency outcome” of competitive bribery obtained
in past literature. Market distortions lead to sub-optimal outcomes yet they continue
to play a prominent role in economic policy in developing countries. Their continued
existence is largely attributable to office bearers’ motive to maximize the appropriation
of rents generated by market distortions. It is the interaction between these bureaucratic
incentives and the quality of institutions that determines the level of market distortions
in the economy. Theories that fail to take the quality of institutions and bureaucratic
financial incentives for market distortions will not adequately explain the existence of high
distortions.
Self enriching policy makers aim to maximize on the appropriation of rents from market
distortions. This entails raising the level of distortions despite welfare losses they impose.
Consideration for welfare losses only arises when they affect the likelihood of future extrac-
tion of rents. When institutions are strong, society can hold the policy maker accountable
by voting them out if welfare losses are excessive. A policy maker who cares about con-
tinued extraction of rents will not choose distortions that lead to such excessive welfare
losses. This electoral accountability is absent when institutions are weak because the office
bearer can use electoral manipulation to pacify political pressure. This permits the office













keep hold over power. Thus distortions are higher and last longer in countries with weak
democratic institutions. This argument is confirmed on exchange rate overvaluation in
Sub-Sahara Africa. Dictatorships overvalued the exchange rate by a greater magnitude
than democracies.
Events in Zimbabwe post 1999 substantiate this argument. High distortions have prevailed
since 2000. These distortions placed command over resources in the hands of a few people
in positions of influence. This negatively affected social outcomes. Health outcomes among
children worsened due to limited access to food by the majority of the population after
the policy shift. The decline in food consumption was greater among the poorest and
the middle class who did not benefit from the rents. Inequality in food consumption
increased along with the increase in wealth inequality. This had a negative effect on
health inequality. Yet the incumbent government survived several elections and distortions
continued to increase despite their negative impact on the well being of the majority. The
use of violence and intimidation in these elections is widely documented. At the same,
supporting democratic institutions were too weak to enforce free and fair elections. The
weakness of these institutions and the subsequent erosion of electoral accountability made
it possible for the incumbent to extract higher rents over a long period. This caused great
harm to society as evidenced by the worsening of health outcomes after the policy shift.
5.2 Implications of the findings
Distortions that arise due to office bearers’ pursuit of rents have negative effects on well
being. They cause further deprivation of human capabilities and functions such as health
as highlighted in the case of Zimbabwe. Thus distortions increase poverty. The current
focus on the macro effects of market distortions understates their consequences. Efficiency,
trade, productivity, corruption and growth are only instrumentally important for improv-
ing well-being. Individual health, nutrition and other social outcomes that reflect human
capabilities and functions are intrinsically important. They are the ultimate objective of
economic policies. These deserve more attention in order to fully capture the consequences
of market distortions.
Distortions owe their continued existence to weak democratic institutions hence lack of ac-
countability. Accordingly, their negative social effects are attributable to the weakness of
democratic institutions and lack of electoral accountability too. Thus just as people speak












5.3. Areas of future study
minants of poverty as well. Support for the claim comes from the finding that democratic
institutions play an integral role in determining the level of market distortions hence the
magnitude of social costs of market distortions. Therefore, governance should be given as
much weight as sound economic management when mapping poverty reduction strategies.
Market distortions are a major cause of corruption in developing countries. This corruption
leads to losses in efficiency but they benefit office bearers. These office bearers have
an incentive to maintain high distortions and extract higher rents subject to political
constraints they face. These constraints are determined by the quality of democratic
institutions. Thus the underlying cause of high market distortions and corruption in
developing countries has roots in the weak institutional framework that fail to address
bureaucratic incentives and control their moral hazard.
5.3 Areas of future study
The policy shift in Zimbabwe negatively affected health outcomes hence increased poverty.
The thesis found that access to food declined after the policy shift. This calls for a further
investigation on the impact of reduced access to food on absolute poverty as measured food-
energy intake for various sub-groups. Changes in school attendance and grades progression
is another aspect of poverty that needs to be investigated in the context of policy changes
in Zimbabwe. This will contribute to the evaluation of the full social impact of market
distortions sustained to benefit the incumbent in a weak policy environment.
The case of rent generating distortions highlights a conflict of interest for self enriching
policy makers. The same conflict of interest arises with bureaucrats in business. These
bureaucrats may have vested interest that are directly affected by economic or sectoral
policies they draft. They have an incentive to implement policies that maximize profits
from their businesses irrespective of welfare consequences of such policies. There is need
to investigate the impact of bureaucrats in business on the quality of economic policies
and research on the design of an institutional framework that aligns the incentives of
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Table A.1. Static panel results
VARIABLES pooled_OLS pooled_IV Fixed Effects (FE)
Polity2 -0.0297*** -0.0271*** -0.0209***
(0.00846) (0.00879) (0.00571)
ODA aid -2.390*** -2.641*** -1.436***
(0.485) (0.528) (0.299)
Terms of trade 0.00452*** 0.00410*** 0.00491***
(0.00144) (0.00149) (0.000862)
Openness 0.000174 0.00322 6.27e-07
(0.00218) (0.00321) (0.00246)
Transition88 1.582*** 1.637*** 0.198
(0.275) (0.282) (0.155)
Transition77 1.457*** 1.495*** 0.0355
(0.261) (0.266) (0.145)
GDP per capita -0.230** -0.301** -0.581***
(0.106) (0.120) (0.166)
FDI 0.00916 -0.0321 0.00843
(0.0134) (0.0344) (0.00717)
Constant 1.837** 2.312*** 4.267***
(0.769) (0.860) (1.176)
Observations 376 376 376
FE test (F-statistic) 52.60***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Standard errors in parentheses
Table A.2. Mean food index, HAZ and WAZ by asset quartile
Food Index HAZ WAZ
Asset Range 1999 2005 %∆ 1999 2005 %∆ 1999 2005 %∆
poorest 25% 2.76 1.68 -39.11 -1.32 -1.48 -12.12 -0.80 -0.94 -17.5
25 - 50 % 3.03 2.00 -33.99 -1.45 -1.40 3.44 -0.80 -0.82 -2.5
50 - 75 % 3.56 2.22 -37.64 -1.12 -1.16 -3.57 -0.56 -0.58 -3.57
75 - 100% 4.23 3.29 -22.22 -0.98 -1.17 -19.38 -0.32 -0.37 -15.62
All 3.41 2.24 -34.31 -1.17 -1.36 -16.52 -0.61 -0.69 -13.11












Table A.3. Concentration indices based on the pooled asset index
1999 2005
Variable Mean C index Std Errora Mean C index Std Errora ∆ C
Stuntingb 1.168 -0.0775 0.0159 1.361 -0.0490 0.0104 -36.8
Underweightb 0.608 -0.182 0.0213 0.693 -0.194 0.0160 6.6
Food consumption 3.406 0.0971 0.00609 2.244 0.140 0.00725 44.1
Access to sanitation 0.633 0.228 0.00691 0.601 0.271 0.00587 18.9
Has Diarrhea 0.141 -0.0444 0.0251 0.131 -0.0947 0.0212 113.2
No. of under 5 in household 1.747 -0.0478 0.00485 1.812 -0.0499 0.00345 4.4
Access to safe water 0.765 0.101 0.00498 0.701 0.140 0.00468 39.0
Lives in rural area 0.766 -0.209 0.00632 0.750 -0.230 0.00533 10.1
Age 29.613 -0.00047 0.00540 30.015 -0.00216 0.00433 360.6
Age squared 1175.2 -0.00141 0.00835 1205.7 -0.00513 0.00665 264.0
Gender (female=1) 0.496 0.00635 0.00933 0.499 0.00869 0.00746 36.8
Mother’s education 4.431 -0.0396 0.00457 4.282 -0.0428 0.00339 8.2
Household head education 6.458 0.162 0.00546 6.852 0.127 0.00376 -21.3
Household head sex 0.367 -0.0832 0.01183 0.348 -0.0946 0.00994 13.7
Was born small 0.160 -0.0570 0.0242 0.150 -0.0638 0.0202 11.9
Had fever 0.256 -0.0207 0.0176 0.0844 -0.0342 0.0272 65.4
Had a cough 0.399 -0.0243 0.0128 0.224 -0.0831 0.0152 241.2
Household head age 42.206 -0.0360 0.00309 42.341 -0.0172 0.00261 -52.1
a - This is the standard error of the concentration index













Table A.4. Descriptive statistics: Composition of DHS samples for 1999 and 2005/6
All Mother Present Mother Absent
Variable Category 1999 2005 1999 2005 1999 2005
Sample size 3892 5943 3327 5034 565 909
Type of residence
urban 23.43 25.03 24.47 26.36 17.35 17.6
rural 76.57 74.97 82.85 82.4 75.53 73.64
Gender
male 50.41 50.12 50.62 50.02 49.2 50.72
female 49.59 49.88 49.38 49.98 50.8 49.28
Household head gender
male 63.28 65.21 65.46 67.48 50.44 52.59
female 36.72 34.79 34.54 32.52 49.56 47.41
Orphan 0.5 10.07 – – 4.19 8.44
Father is alive 93.45 92.05 95.44 94.6 81.52 77.9
Mother is alive 98.48 97.59 – – 89.29 84.16
Mother not in household 14.52 15.3 – – – –
Household head age
below 18 0.73 0.3 0.7 .023 0.94 0.7
19-29 24.06 23.08 26.63 26.03 8.82 6.62
30-39 26.86 30.37 29.99 34.03 9.01 9.87
40-49 18.29 14.94 18.11 15.1 19.32 14.05
50-59 13.38 14.83 11.87 12.03 22.33 30.55
60+ 16.58 165.48 12.7 12.59 39.59 38.21
Relation to household head
son/daughter 64.72 63.28 74.27 73.48 8.5 6.44
grandchild 26.77 28.06 18.97 19.61 72.74 75.11
other 8.48 8.65 6.73 6.9 18.77 18.44
Relation structure
1 adult 11.87 11.68 11.72 11.01 12.74 15.4
2 adults, opp sex 34.89 34.69 37 37.31 22.48 20.24
2 adults same sex 4.75 5.47 4.54 4.99 6.02 8.14
3+ related adults 42.39 43.72 40.73 42.35 52.21 51.27
unrelated adults 6.09 4.42 6.01 4.33 6.55 4.95












Table A.5. Demographic statistics: Comparison of DHS samples for 1999 and 2005/6
Variable Category 2005 1999
Major category Sub-Category
Household population
by sex and age
Male
Urban (%)
0 - 4 12 12.9
5 - 9 12.7 10.6
Rural (%)
0 - 4 16.4 14.6
5 - 9 18.3 16.3
Female
Urban (%)
0 - 4 11.8 13
5 - 9 11.2 10.4
Rural (%)
0 - 4 14.1 13.3
5 - 9 15.2 15.1
Total
Urban (%)
0 - 4 11.9 12.9
5 - 9 11.9 10.5
Rural (%)
0 - 4 15.2 14
5 - 9 16.6 15.7
Fertility rates
Total fertility rate 15 - 49 3.8 4
General fertility rate (per 1000) 137 141








Children ever born 2.15 2.31
Children living 1.99 2.1
Currently married
Children ever born 2.89 3.13
Children living 2.69 2.85
Infant mortality (per
1000 births)




≤ average 83 118.8

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.7. Results with robust clustered standard er-
rors: Determinants of HAZ and WAZ
HAZ WAZ
VARIABLES 1999 2005 1999 2005
Rural 0.0930 -0.2241** -0.1014 -0.1561**
(0.1150) (0.1038) (0.0718) (0.0780)
Sanitation 0.1226 -0.0106 0.0664 0.1491**
(0.1022) (0.0820) (0.0641) (0.0614)
Safe water 0.0981 -0.1313 0.0656 -0.0036
(0.1112) (0.0824) (0.0695) (0.0617)
No. of children -0.0889 -0.0811 -0.1808* -0.2339***
(0.1572) (0.1293) (0.0991) (0.0893)
No. of children squared -0.0058 -0.0011 0.0339 0.0299
(0.0337) (0.0259) (0.0209) (0.0182)
Household size 0.0094 0.0033 -0.0134 0.0107
(0.0197) (0.0179) (0.0135) (0.0137)
Household head gender -0.2556*** -0.1273 -0.0950 0.0003
(0.0944) (0.0780) (0.0598) (0.0587)
Household head age -0.0194 -0.0270* 0.0165 -0.0056
(0.0174) (0.0146) (0.0107) (0.0104)
Household head age2 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002** -0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Household head education 0.0291** 0.0039 0.0291*** 0.0295***
(0.0131) (0.0121) (0.0092) (0.0094)
Mothers’ education 0.0265 0.0111 0.0090 0.0076
(0.0194) (0.0173) (0.0127) (0.0137)
Age in months -0.1322*** -0.1477*** -0.0545*** -0.0761***
(0.0144) (0.0118) (0.0088) (0.0075)
Age squared 0.0016*** 0.0018*** 0.0006*** 0.0009***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Gender 0.2578*** 0.2065*** 0.2006*** 0.1423***













Was born small -0.4282*** -0.3505*** -0.4638*** -0.5135***
(0.0945) (0.0867) (0.0689) (0.0670)
Breastfeeding duration 0.0024 0.0145* -0.0094 0.0018
(0.0106) (0.0074) (0.0059) (0.0043)
Food*Breastfeeding 0.0009 -0.1025*** -0.0084 -0.0368*
(0.0297) (0.0303) (0.0175) (0.0205)
Food consumption index 0.0611*** 0.0605** 0.0457*** 0.0613***
(0.0235) (0.0251) (0.0155) (0.0173)
Has diarrhea -0.2774** -0.2195** -0.1193 -0.2517***
(0.1095) (0.0933) (0.0745) (0.0728)
Has fever 0.0536 -0.0043 -0.2285*** -0.2355**
(0.0950) (0.1141) (0.0606) (0.0940)
Coughs -0.0288 -0.0556 -0.0362 0.0174
(0.0805) (0.0756) (0.0541) (0.0588)
Constant 0.6804 1.4355*** 0.0722 0.4662
(0.4968) (0.4114) (0.3167) (0.2994)
lambda 0.6804 1.4355*** 0.0722 0.4662
(0.4968) (0.4114) (0.3167) (0.2994)
rho 0.6804 1.4355*** 0.0722 0.4662
(0.4968) (0.4114) (0.3167) (0.2994)
Observations 2945 3723 3043 3876
NB: Selection equations are not presented in the table, Robust standard errors in parentheses












Table A.8. OLS regression results: Determinants of
HAZ and WAZ for children living with their mothers only
1999 2005
VARIABLES HAZ HAZ WAZ WAZ
Rural 0.0290 -0.2667*** -0.1344* -0.1703**
(0.107) (0.101) (0.069) (0.077)
Sanitation 0.1029 0.0240 0.0544 0.1716***
(0.097) (0.079) (0.062) (0.060)
Safe water 0.0704 -0.1386* 0.0512 0.0026
(0.105) (0.080) (0.068) (0.060)
No. of children -0.0958 -0.2340* -0.1904** -0.2988***
(0.146) (0.119) (0.092) (0.087)
No. of children squared 0.0046 0.0279 0.0395** 0.0412**
(0.031) (0.023) (0.019) (0.018)
Household size -0.0157 -0.0065 -0.0211* 0.0078
(0.018) (0.017) (0.012) (0.013)
Household head gender -0.0432 0.0337 -0.0014 0.0905
(0.088) (0.075) (0.056) (0.057)
Household head age 0.0101 0.0013 0.0296*** 0.0096
(0.016) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010)
Household head age squared -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0003*** -0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Household head education 0.0244* 0.0028 0.0284*** 0.0295***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009)
Mothers’ education 0.0252 0.0086 0.0079 0.0071
(0.020) (0.018) (0.013) (0.014)
Age in months -0.1087*** -0.1309*** -0.0425*** -0.0655***
(0.016) (0.012) (0.009) (0.007)
Age squared 0.0014*** 0.0018*** 0.0005*** 0.0009***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Gender 0.2702*** 0.1942*** 0.2035*** 0.1311***
(0.073) (0.064) (0.048) (0.048)
Was born small -0.4632*** -0.3401*** -0.4611*** -0.5018***
(0.099) (0.090) (0.068) (0.068)













(0.013) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004)
Food*Breastfeeding -0.0016 -0.1286*** -0.0169 -0.0460**
(0.031) (0.031) (0.018) (0.021)
Food consumption index 0.0598** 0.0720*** 0.0443*** 0.0655***
(0.024) (0.026) (0.016) (0.018)
Has diarrhea -0.2978*** -0.2151** -0.1174 -0.2402***
(0.113) (0.095) (0.074) (0.072)
Has fever 0.0716 -0.0204 -0.2400*** -0.2365**
(0.099) (0.119) (0.061) (0.095)
Coughs -0.0536 -0.0840 -0.0396 0.0105
(0.084) (0.077) (0.054) (0.059)
Constant -0.3780 0.5582 -0.3923 -0.0796
(0.480) (0.405) (0.306) (0.290)
Observations 2404 2829 2503 2982
R-squared 0.093 0.108 0.112 0.116
Robust standard errors in parentheses
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